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IN THE 
_Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia . 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 1673 
\, 
,· 
S. F. PRATT AND MELVIN 0. POWELL 
versus 
JANIE F. MILES, AN INFANT; ·WHO SUES BY, ETC. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the ·Honorable Chief Justice and Justices of the s~epreme 
Court of Appeals of Virgi'J~ia: · · · 
Your petitioners,· S. Frank Pratt and Melvin 0. Powell,' 
respectfully represent that they are greatly aggrieved by a 
final judgment of the Corporation Court of the City of Lynch-: 
burg, Virginia, pronounced ·on the 1st day of ~pril, 1935, in: 
an action at law in which your petitioners were the .defend-. 
ants, and Janie F. Miles, who sties, by etc., was the plaintiff. 
Your petitioners will hereinafter refer to themselves as 
defendants· and to Janie F. Miles as plaintiff, such designa-
tion of the parties being in accordance with the respective 
positions occupied by them on the trial of the _case. ~ duly 
authenticated transcript. of the record in ~his case and ~x-: 
hibits :filed with the evidence are hereto attached and here-
with presented as a part of this petition, and it is prayed that 
this petition and said transcript of the record and exhibits 
he read together and treated as defendants' :first brief on. 
Rppeal. · · · · · · 
. . ~ .,_ . 
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PRELIMINARY. 
The plaintiff instituted her notice of motion for damnges 
for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by her 
on account of the negligent operation by the Lynchburg Trac-
tion & Light Company of its street car, and the negligent 
operation by 1\felvin 0. Powell of a motorcycle belonging to 
S. Frank Pratt. After the evidence for the plaintiff had 
been presented, the Court struck out the evidence as to the 
Lynchburg Traction & Light Cotnpany, and there was a ver-
dict and judgment for the defendant, Lynchburg Traction & 
I.Jight Company (now not involved here), and for the plain-
tiff, Janie F. Miles, against S. Frank Pratt and Melvin 0. 
Powell, for $1,500.00 and costs, and it is to the judgment 
against S. Frank Pratt and 1\{elvin 0. Powell that these said 
defendants pray that a writ of error and supersedeas be 
awarded, and that said judgment be reversed and set aside, 
and that judgment be entered in this court for petitioners. 
STATEl\fENT OF FACTS. 
The accident which resulted in the injury complained of 
occurred in the 'City of Lynchburg, near the intersection of 
Seventeenth Street and Campbell Avenue, about 10:30 P. M. 
on the night of Christmas Eve~ December 24, 1934. Camp-
bell .Avenue runs approximately northwest and southeast. 
Seventeenth Street forms an acute angle with Campbell Ave-
nue, and runs approximately north from Campbell A venue. 
Bibee's Store, Twelfth Street, and the other numbered streets 
up to Seventeenth Street, referred to in the evidence, are 
located on the northwest side of the intersection. Fair-
view Heights, referred to in the evidence, is located on the 
southeast side of the intersection. As one proceeds on Camp-
bell .Avenue in a southeasterly direction approaching Seven-
teenth Street, he goes under two railroad bridges before reach-
ing the intersection of Seventeenth Street and Campbell Ave'-
nue, making the intersection a blind corner in thus ap-
proaching. On approaching Seventeenth Street in a south-
easterly direction, there is a rather descending steep grade, 
estimated at six per cent immediately before reaching· the in-
tersection. From the intersection and some distance beyond,. 
it is approximately level throughout its length and breadth. 
There is a single street car track on Seventee'Ilth Street, which 
track continues into the intersection and on ·Campbell Ave-
nue southeast of the intersection. A street car was proceed-
ing in a. northwesterly direction approaching the intersection. 
and had almost reached the curve in the track which led 
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into Seventeenth Street. At this time the motorman on the 
street ear noticed a motorcycle with a side car approaching 
in the opposite direction (S. E.) on its proper side of the 
street, and a short distance to the front of the street car. 
Because of the narrowness of the street and the overhanging 
of the street car in making the turn into Seventeenth Street, 
the motorman brought the street car to a standstill. For 
the same reason the driver of the motorcycle brought the mo-
torcycle to a standstill. At the place where the street car 
and motorcycle stopped, Campbell A venue is 27 feet. wide. 
The street car track is 5 feet wide, and the distance· from 
each curbing to the closest car rail is 11 feet. The overli~g­
ing of the street car is 2 feet, 6 inches. The motorcycle when 
stopped was 18 inches from the nearest curbing and the dis-
tance from the rear of the motorcycle to the front of the 
street car, with both standing still, was 23~~ feet. The width 
of the street car was 8 feet, 4 inches, and the width of the 
motorcycle and side car was slightly over 6 feet, its length 
being 8% feet. The headlight on the street car, as well as 
the lights inside the street car, was burning. The headlight 
of the motorcycle was burning. To the northwest and back 
of the motorcycle was located a street light, which was also 
burning. The pole from 'vhich the light was suspended was 
63% feet from the street car and 40 feet from the rear of the 
motorcycle. In the street car, besides the operator, were two 
passeng·ers, only one of whom could be located. On the motor-
cycle was the driver, Melvin 0. Powell, and in the side car 
holding a wrecked motorcycle was V. D. Farmer. The mo-: 
torcycle and street car had been standing for an appreciable 
time before the accident. Normally, the view of the scene 
is unobstructed and could be seen for over 700 feet (DeMott, 
p. 67. Also see plat and photograph). 
A Ford 1931 Coach was approaching from the rear of the 
motorcycle, along Campbell Avenue in a southeasterly direc-
tion towards the intersection. In this automobile were three 
persons, ·all three sitting on the front seat. The car was 
driven by Thomas }files, age nineteen; in the middle wa~ 
sitting Jane Armstrong, and on the right the plaintiff, Janie 
F. Miles, was seated. There was a highway marker desig-
nating ''Slow'' on Thomas Miles' right and located at a point 
240 feet northwest of the street light pole. There was no 
traffic nor parked cars between the Miles automobile and the 
motionless street car and motorcycle. Thomas Miles saw 
the marker and was proceeding at a speed of twenty-five miles 
an hour. The four wheel·brakes on the automobile were in 
perfect condition, and the _bright headlights were burning. 
Thomas Miles testified that when proceeding down grade the 
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lights of his automobile would shine down in front of him; 
but when he reached the level portion of the street, they would 
shine out to· the front on the motorcycle. He also testified 
that he could,stop his automobile when travelling at the above 
~peed, in a distance of twenty feet. From the rear of the 
motorcycle to a distance of from 60 to 80 feet northwest 
(back) of the motorcycle on Campbell Avenue, the street is 
approximately level. ~1:iles was travelling on the right or 
southwest side of Campbell Avenue, and according to his 
testimony and the testimony of the occupants of the automo-
pile; the street car was in full view, but the motorcycle was 
not seen until the Miles car was right on it, about five feet 
from it. When· Thomas Miles saw the motorcycle, he en-
deavored to cut around and drive 'between the motorcycle and 
the ~treet car, and in doing so ran into the street car, the 
left·front part of the automobile striking the left front part 
of the street car. In the accident, the plaintiff, Janie F. 
Miles ·received cuts on her face, and this injury was the in~ 
jury upon which the action was based. The above facts are 
undisputed. 
The occupants of the Miles car stated that there was no 
t•ed light burning on the rear of the motorcycle, and that if 
there had been one they could have seen it. Your petitioners 
defended on the ground that the rear light was burning, and 
that even if it were not, there was no duty to maintain the 
rear light, in view of a City Ordinance of the City of Lynch-
burg, which provided that no rear light was necessary on a 
parked ·vehicle, 'vhether the same be attended or unattended, 
if there was sufficient light to reveal persons a distance of 
200 feet, and that in no event could this be the proximate 
cause of the accident . 
. The. only material conflict of evidence, so far as the facts 
are concerned, is as to whether the rear light was burning 
on the motorcycle at the time of the accident. The court in 
its oral instruction treated this as the only material question 
of fact,· and in effect told the jury that if they believed the 
light was burning, they should find for the defendant, and 
if they believed it was not burning, they should find for the 
plaintiff, unless they further believed that at the tinie and 
place it 'vas unnecessary to have it burning, under the city 
ordinance, which provide that there need be rio lig·ht btirn-: 
ing, -if the· car is parked at a point where a person could be 
seen· 200 feet away. 
It is respectfully submitted that there was no proper evi-
dence under which the jury could find that the rear light was 
not·burning, and that it was in fact burning. We feel it neces-
sary, therefore, to call the attention of" the Court 'to the sur~ 
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1·ounding circumsta·nces and evidence on_ this point, and we 
call attention to the following: . 
· It is submitted that the rear light on the motorcycle was 
in fact burning, and that there was no proper evidence under 
·which the jury could find to the contrary, for the following 
reasons: 
· 1st. Powell, the operator of the motorcycle, and Farmer 
1·iding in the side car, testified positively that the rear light 
was burning when they picked up the other wrecked motor~ 
·cycle and put it in the side car (Rec., pp. 113 and 104). 
·F,armer also testified positively that it was burning when 
they turned into Campbell A venue from Seventeenth Street, 
just a few feet from the point of accident (Rec., pp. 104 and 
1.05). Both Powell and Farmer testified that it was burning 
immediately after the accident (Rec., pp. 106 and 115). Dean, 
a passenger on the street car, testified that he jumped out 
"Of the stre~t. car when the impact occurred, and that the tail 
light on the motorcycle was burning at that time (Rec., p. 
83). There is no denial of the positive testimony of all wit-
nesses who testified on the point, that the headlight on the 
1notorcycle was burning at the time of the accident, nor of the 
testimony that the headlight and rear light worked on the 
same switch (Knowles, Rec., p. 98, Powell, Rec. p. 115). 
When Police Officer Reynolds came to investigate, the switch 
'vas turned on and both headlight and tail light came on 
(Rec., p. 116). . 
Against the above positive testimony there is only the tes-
timony of the three occupants of the Ford automobile, who 
say that the rear light was not burning, and that if it had 
been, they would have seen it. It is admitted by all that the 
headlight of the street car 'vas burning, and the inside lights 
of the street car were lit, all of which would put the motor-
cycle in plain _ sig·ht, and in addition to that, the street light 
about forty feet back was burning, and the headlights of the 
Ford car itself would shjne directly on the motorcycle from 
the time the Ford car reached the bottom of the depression, a 
distance of more than 80 feet. All three of the occupants of 
the car stated that they did not see the motorcycle, which 
had a side car attached, with a driver on the motorcycle and 
a man in the side car, and in addition a ,vrecked motorcycle 
held in the side car, until they were "right on it", a dis-
f"ance estimated at 5 feet or so. The whole scene was well 
lighted, and "there can be only one explanation of why the 
motorcycle was not seen, regardless of whether it had the 
rear lighf burning or not, and that is that the occupants of 
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the Ford car were not looking. Police Officer Reynolds gave 
positive testimony that at the time and place, that is, in the 
night time, the motorcycle could have been seen for a dis-
tance of 200 feet away, and witness J{nowles testified to the 
same effect (Rec., pp. 63-64, and Rec., pp. 99 and 100). There 
is no testimonv in denial of these statements. The state-
ments of the occupants are only that they did not see the 
motorcycle until they were right on it. The physical facts 
are such that it cannot be denied that if the occupants of 
the automobile had been looking ahead, they \Vould neces-
sarily have seen the motorcycle. It is obvious that even had 
the rear light been burning, they would not have seen it, for 
the same reason they did not see the motorcycle, and under 
all the facts their testimony is plainly valueless, and not suf-
ficient for a holding that the rear light was not burning. 
In the face of the positive testimony shown above, their tes-
timony in effect becomes mere negative testimony, in view 
of these circumstances. 
2nd. A further consideration which we think it proper to 
bring out at this time, is that even if the rear light were not 
bu:ruing (though it is submitted that. it was burning) there 
could have been no· possible causal connection between this 
fact and the accident. 
As shown above, it is obvious that the three young occu-
pants of the approaching automobile ·were not keeping any 
sort of lookout, ·but ran into a perfectly obvious and plain 
object. Whether the three sitting on the front seat were en-
gaged in conversation and not paying attention, or what-
ever the reason is, they did not see the motorcycle, though it 
was plainly obvious from all the testimony, by even casual 
attention; the natural question arises as to how could the 
presence or absence of the rear lig-ht have any effect. Plainly 
they would not have seen it until they looked, and plainly 
they did not look until they were ''right on the motorcycle'', 
when it was too late to avoid the accident. Thus, the same 
result would have followed \Vhether the rear light was burn-
ing or not, and therefore the presence or absence of the light 
could have had no causal connection whatsoever with the 
accident. 
3rd. Further, it is submitted that even if the rear light 
were not burning, there was under the law no negligence 
through this fact. The State law, Code Section 2154 (145) 
requires lights to be turned on after dark ''except that local 
authorities may provide by ordinance that no lights need be 
displayed upon any such vehicle when parked in accordance 
with the local ordinance". The Lynchburg- City Code, pur-
suant to that statute, provides that rear and front lights shall 
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be displayed in the hours of darkness, but section 242 of the 
Code of 1931, provides as follows: 
''Lights on Parked Vehicles. 
''Whenever a vehicle is parked or stopped upon a highway, 
whether attended ·or unattended, during- the times mentioned 
in section two hundred thirty-eight (238), there shall be dis-
played upon such vehicle one or more lamps projecting a 
white light visible under normal atmospheric -conditions from 
a distance of five hundred feet to the front of such vehic!e, 
and pr,ojecting a red or yellow light visible under like con-
ditions from a distance of 500 feet to the rear, ex-cept that 
no lights need be displayed upon any such vehicle when parked 
upon any highway where there is sufficient light to reveal any 
person within a distance of-two hundred feet upon such high-
ways." (Rec., p. 120.) 
The uncontroverted evidence in the case is that at the time 
and place the motorcycle· while standing came within the ex-
ception mentioned in the ordinance and authorized under the 
statute. There was thus no basis for any finding that the 
n1otorcycle was illegally parked without a rear light, even if 
there had been none, as the positive evidence is all one way 
0'11 the subject. The testimony is referred to above. 
4th. A further point is that under the facts and circum-
stances related, even if there had been no rear light, it could 
uot possibly have been the proximate cause of the accident, 
but at best showed a mere prior "state of negligence", which 
was superseded as a proximate cause by the subsequent in-
tervening negligence of ]\files, the driver of the automobile, 
in failing to observe an entirely obvious situation, as shown 
hy the testimony, physical facts, plat, photographs, and by 
common knowledge and experience. Thus, his failure to keep 
n lookout and stop or check his car, when the motorcycle and 
street car were in plain sight, and when he could have avoided 
the accident, was in fact the sole proximate cause of the acci-
dent. This matter will be adverted to later, but is put in 
at this point, in order to complete the facts. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
Your petitioners assign as error the action of the Court 
in the following particulars, to-wit: 
I. In refusing to sustain petitioner's motion to strike out 
the evidence of the plaintiff; · 
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IL Refusal to give each and all of the instructions offered 
by the petitioner, and the giving of erroneous oral instruc-
tions on the Court's own motion in lieu thereof; 
III. In refusing to set aside the verdict on the grounds 
that it was contrary to the law and evidence, and enter up 
judgment for the defendants. 
ARGUMENT. 
ASSIGNMENTS I AND III. 
These two assignments deal with the action of the. Court 
in refusing to strike the evidence 1!)1d the action of the Court 
in refusing to set aside the verdict and enter up judgment for 
the defendant. The two assignments involve the same ques-
tions, and will therefore be treated together. 
The considerations governing this question, incidentally,. 
are covered to some extent in connection with the statement 
of facts, and are based on tl1e following points: 
.A.. There is no evidence of any legal negligence on the part 
of the petitioners. 
As shown above, the Court in its oral instruction held, and 
properly held, that there was no negligence in stopping the 
motorcycle at the time and place. .As a matter of fact, it was 
in the exercise of care and caution that this was done, both 
the street car and_ the motorcycle stopping for the same rea-
son, as it appears that there was some question as to whether 
the space with the overhang of the car would be sufficient 
to permit the street car and motorcycle to pass as the street 
car 'vas rounding the curve. The only other possible negli-
gence 'vas the question as to the rear light on the motorcycle • 
.As shown above in the treatment of this question, there was 
no negligence in this respect, because under the State law 
and City Ordinance no light was required under the circum-
stances. The motorcycle itself had its headlight burning .. 
The street car in front of it had the headlight burning, the 
inside lights of the street car were burning, and there was 
a street arc light just forty feet in the rear of the motor-
cycle, so that ti1e whole situation was highly lighted and 
plainly 0 1bvious. The undisputed testimony is that there was 
sufficient light for the whole matter to have been seen over 
two hundred feet a'vay. · The testimony and photographs 
show that the situation was in view from a point more than 
700 feet awav in the day time·, and that it could easily be seen 
more than 200 feet away at night is not only shown by the 
evidence, but is necessarily true from the physical facts, and 
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common knowledg·e and judg·ment, and ordinary every-day 
experience. The City Ordinance requiring no rear light un-
der such circumstances, and the whole situation being obvious 
and plainly visible, there was no negligence, even if the light 
had not been burning. 
B. As shown above, the positive evidence and facts de-
tailed in regard thereto, conclusively show that the light was 
in fact burning, and the testimony of the three occupants of 
the Ford car that they did not see it, and would have seen 
i 1 if it had been burning, is in fa.ct mere negative testimony, 
in view of the positive testimony and facts, which show that 
it was necessarily burning·. The light was burning when the 
nwtorcycle turned into Campbell Avenue, a few feet from 
the scene of the accident, and worked on the same switch 
with the headlight, which was admittedly burning before and 
after the accident. It was tested for the officer when he ar-
rived on the scene and when the switch was turned, both 
lights came on, and the testimony of the driver of the motor-
cycle and of the man in the side car was positive that it 'vas 
burning immediately after the accident (the accident did not 
affect it because the motorcyCle was in fact not struck, or if 
nt all orily very slightly), and the testimony of Dean, a passen-
ger on the street ~ar, was that it was burning when he jumped 
out of the car as the impact occurred and went back to in-
vestigate. On top of this, it is admitted by the occupants of 
the car that they did not see the motorcycle with the two 
men and broken motorcycle on it until they were within 
probably five feet of it, which conclusively shows that they 
were not paying attention, and could not have been paying 
attention, or they would necessarily have seen the plainly 
visible motorcycle. The lights of the Ford car itself were 
shining directly on it from a distance more than forty feet 
hack, a•nd the driver testified that he could have stopped in 
twenty feet. TaldnQ,' the evidence as a 'vhole, there was no 
P.vidence to justify the jury in finding that the light was not 
hurning. 
The principles here contended for follow those lines of 
cases in which it is held that the Court will not accept testi-
mony which is contrary to human experience, the law~ of na-
ture. or phvsicfll facts. In N or.folk £t TV estern Railwa~t Co. v. 
8t1·iclcle1·, 118 V a. 153, 155, 86 S. E. 824, the Court said: 
''This Court has repeatedly d~clared that courts are not 
rermired to believe that which is contrary to human experience 
nnd the laws of nature, or which they judicially know to be 
incredible. Though the case be heard as upon a demurrer to 
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the evidence, the court will not stultify itself by allowing a 
verdict to stand, although there may be evidence tending to 
support it, when the physical facts demonstrate such evi-
qence to be untrue and the verdict to be unjust and unsup-
ported in law and in fact. C. & 0. Ry. C'o. v. Anderson, 93 
Va. 650, 25 S. E. 947; Harvey's cas.e, 103 Va. 850, 49 S. E. 
481; Clopton's case, 109 Va. 813, 63 S. E. 1022; N. !t fV. Ry. 
Co. v. Cro'we's Ad1n·r., 110 Va. 798, 67 S. E. 518; Sotttthen?. 
Ry. Co. v. Wiley, 112 Va. 183, 70 S. E. 510. 
"In the case last mentioned, Judge J{eith cites with ap-
proval ~Ioore on Facts, wherein it is said: 'Uourts are not 
so deaf to the voice of nature, or so blind to the laws of 
physics, that every utterance of a witness in derogation of 
these laws 'viii be treated as testimony of probative. value 
because of its utterance. A court will treat that as unsaid 
by a witness which in the very nature of things could not be 
said.' '' 
C. Another reason 'vhv the evidence should have been 
stricken or the verdict set aside and judgment entered for 
the defendant is that under no circumstances could either the 
absence or existence of a burning- rear light have been the 
proximate cause of the accident. The evidence is uncontra-
dicted that the motorcycle and street car had both been stand-
ing for an appreciable time before the acciaent, and in plain 
and obvious view of anything approaching. Even if the 
rear light were not burning, and that were negligence (which 
could not be as shown above), still there would have been no 
liability, as that condition would not have been the proxi-
mate cause, but would have been at most a mere prior ''state 
of negligence", to which the law would not refer the accident, 
but instead of referring it to the ren1ote cause would refer it 
to the proxin1ate cause, which was obviously the negligence 
of Thomas 1\files in not keeping· a proper lookout to avoid the 
accident, which could have been avoided by him easily with 
the exercise of any degree of care. 
In Fowlkes v. Souither·n Railway Co1npany, 96 Va. 742, 
7 45, 32 S. E. 464, the Court said : 
" 'It is not only requisite that damage, actual or inferen-
tial, should be suffered, but this damage must be the legiti-
mate sequence of the thrng amiss. The maxim of the la"r 
here applicable is, that in la'v the immediate and not the re-
mote cause of any event is regarded. * * * In other words, 
the law always refers the injury to the proximate, not to the 
remote cause. ~ * * If an injury has resulted in consequence 
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of a certain wrongful act or omission, but only through or 
by means of some intervening cause, from whieh last cause 
the injury follo,ved as a direct and immediate consequence, 
the law will refer the damage to the last or proximate cause, 
and refuse to trace it to that which was more remote. * * • 
To the proximate cause we may usually trace eonsequences 
with some degTee of assurance; but beyond that we enter a 
field of conjecture, where the uncertainty renders the attempt 
at exact conclusions futile. * * * If the wrong and the result-
i'ng damage are not known by common experience to be 
naturally and usually in sequence, and the damage does not, 
accordin8· to the ordinary course of events, follow from the 
wrong, tnen the wrong and the damage are not sufficiently 
conjoined or concatenated as cause and effect to support an 
action.' '' 
In Southern Railway Con~pany v. Bailey, 110 Va. 833, 845, 
67 S. E. 365, the same principle is recognized, the Court 
l1olding that the 'veil established exception to the general 
rule arises in such cases, that is, that one party lmew, or 
in the exercise of ordinary care ought to have known of the 
existi'ng negligence of the other party, and could have avoided 
the accident, but failed to do so, and there can be no recovery 
against prior parties as the subsequent negligence in failing _ 
to exercise ordinary care to avoid the injury was the imme-
diate or proximate and efficient cause of the accident, which 
intervenes bohveen the accident and the remote negligenc of 
the other party. 
A recent and a case very apposite to the instant case is 
Bassett & Co1npany v. Wood, 146 Va. 654, 132 S. E. 700. Iri 
that case the plaintiff recovered. The plaintiff was a pedes-
trian and the claim was made that she was jay-walking when 
she was struck by a truck. She had started across the street, 
seeing- no traffic approaching, and gotten over the first car 
rail alon~· the center of the street when the accident hap-
pened. There was considerable traffic on the other side of 
the street. She had stopped and was waiting for this traffic 
to pass, when she was run into by the truck. The defendant 
contended that she was guilty of neglig-ence and was not look-
ing· to the south for cars coming out of the line of traffic and 
g-oing north. The defendant further contended that the plain-
tiff was crossing the street between crossings, contrary to 
ordinance. In dealing with this question, the opinion re-
ferred to the general principle, as stated in the cases last 
~itecl, and then states as follows: 
"'It is settled-law in Virginia that the violation of an or-
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dinance or statute does not make the violator guilty of neg-
ligence for which damages may be recovered unless the act 
was the proximate cause of the injury. The doctrine in that 
respect being that the law reg·ards the immediate or proxi-
mate cause which directly produces the injury, and not the 
remote cause which may have antecedently contributed to iL 
In order for the negligence of the party violating the or-
dinance to be contributory or concurring it must have some 
immediate causal connection, or be the proximate cause of 
the injury. If, while one is negligent-perhaps the expres-
sion should be, in a state of negligence-another negligently 
employs an independent force, whicl1, availing itself of the 
occasion afforded by the former's negligence, works a harm 
not its natural and probable consequences, but an independ-
ent harm, the first negligence is not contributory to the sec~ 
ond.'' (Italics supplied.) P. 661. 
Under the principles above, it is respectfuily submitted 
that under no possible circumstances could the failure to have 
a rear light burning, even if that were negligence, have been 
the proximate cause of the accident, but at most places the 
driver of the motorcycle merely in a "state of negligence'",. 
which was superseded by the independent and intervening 
negligence .of Miles as the efficient and proximate cause of 
the accident. The test is, not whether Miles actually saw 
the situation in time to avoid the accident, but whether he 
could and should have seen it in the exercise of ordinary 
care in time to prevent the accident, and failed to do so. See 
Keeler v. Ba1t1ng(1.rdner, 161 ·va. 507, 513, 171 S. E. 592. 
The situation is such that if ~files had been lreeping any 
sort of lookout driving his car at the admitted speed of not 
over hventy-five miles per hour, the accident could not have 
happened, for even from the point at which he states he saw 
the motorcycle, that is, within five feet thereof, he was still 
more than thirty feet from the street car, into which his au-
tomobile was run. 
Another very similar case is t.hat of Braswell v. Vir.ainia 
Electric Co1npany, 162 Va. 27, 173 S. E. 365, which was iden-
tical with this case, in that a guest was suing the street car 
company on account of injuries sustained when the motor-
cycle in which he was riding collided with the street car. The 
basis of the suit was that the street car had no headlight burn-
ing, no signal was given for the stop, and that they thought 
the· street car was going in the opposite direction from the 
motorcvcle. There was a verdict for the plaintiff, which was 
set aside by the Court,- and the action of the lower court was 
sustained. The Court specifically held that there was enough 
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evidence in the record to support a verdict to the effect that 
the headlight was not burning, and that no bell was rung, 
but stated that even assuming this to be true, the Court was 
asked to believe son1ething- which was contrary to the ex-
periences of men. (Opinion, p. 37.) The plaintiff attempted 
a clailn that the negligence of the operator of the motorcycle 
could not be imputed to the guest, and the opinion also dealt 
with this point, the Court saying: 
''LaPrade, laughing and heedless, ran headlong into a 
street car which had come to a stop or was in the act of 
stopping, and he alone is responsible for the tragedy. Two 
deaths tell us of his speed. 
''LaPrade's negligence could not be imputed to Braswell, 
nncl this opinion rests upon no such presumptio·n, but upon 
the fact that his neg·ligence was the sole proximate cause o~ 
the accident. It is not enough to show that the company was 
negligent when that neglience but remotely and not proxi-
mately contributed to the result.'' P. 40. 
\Ve submit that the opinion of Judge Holt in the. Braswell 
case fits this case identically, and is conclusive of this ques-
tion. 
D. Y ct a further consideration in connection with the fail-
n re of the Court to strike the evidence or set aside the ver-
dict, is the fact that there could have been no causal connec-
tion between the fact that no light was burning (which as 
shown above cannot be accepted under the facts) and the 
accident in question. It is perfectly obvious that the three 
young occupants of the approaching Ford car were not keep-
ing any sort of lookout, which plainly caused the accident. 
They all stated that they did not see the motorcycle with the 
~ide car and the two people and wrecked car. therein, until 
they were right on it, within four or·five feet. It was in plain 
nnd obvious sight from aU the testimony, and as shown by 
the facts it could necessarily have been seen if they were look-
ing·. It is thus apparently conclusive, as they did not see 
the n1otorcyclc, they could not have seen the rear light 
whether burning or not, until they looked, and they did not 
look until they were right on it, and thus the situation would 
have been the same whether the rear light had been burning 
or not. The driver of the Ford car would have been con-
fronted with the identical situation in either event. All the 
eyidence and the facts show that it is inconceivable that 
eithe.r the presen~e or .absence of a burning rear light could 
have made any difference, and that the accident was caused 
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solely by the negligenc of Miles in failing to keep a proper 
lookout, as he drove his automobile, and in failing to look 
until he was right on the 1notorcycle, when according to his 
own testimony, it was too late to avoid the accident. 
II. INSTRUCTIONS. 
This matter will be taken up under two heads: 
A. Oral Instructions of the Court. 
B. Instructions offered and refused by the Court. 
The Court refused all instructions offered by the defend-
ant, and in lieu thereof attempted to instruct the Court orally, 
an instruction which occupied five pages of the record, which 
was merely repeated to the jury o·ncc, and which they could 
not possibly retain for any fair consideration of the ques-
tions, and which oral instruction further did not cover, as 
we see it, essential and material questions in the case. 
It has not been the practice of the Virginia courts to g·ive 
merely an oral charge to the jury. It is obviously unfair 
and impracticable, not only because it would be impossible 
for the jury to retain even the substance of such an instruc-
tion from a mere hearing of same, but they have nothing be-
fore them upon which they can reach a conclusion as to the 
often intricate questions of law, which should g·uide them in 
their deliberations. It is further unfair, in that the attor-
neys themselves cannot of course break in on the court dur-
ing the delivery of the charge, nor can they retain the points 
of a long oral charge, in order to make any properly con-
sidered objections to points thereof 'vhich they may believe 
to be erroneous. It gives no fair opportunity for proper ob-
jections. It violates the principles laid down by this Court to 
th.e effect that instructions offered, and which properly pre-
sent the questions of law involved, must be given as offered, 
unless covered by other instructions. It does not protect 
this last qualification because, even if the oral charge should 
cover the instructions, it could not fairly do so, on account of 
the fact tl1at the jury, not having photostatic minds, could 
not properly consider the questions of fact and applications 
of the la-w thereto. 
This preliminary discussion has been given, as it affects 
both the question of the ·right of the Court to give simply 
oral instructions, and the question of the propriety of re-
fusing proper instructions offered in writing, whether cov-
ered in the oral instruction or not. If the court is to proceed 
to. instruct orally, it should have that instntction taken down, 
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written out, and g-iven · to the jury and the attorneys, in 
'vhich event, of course, it would not be an oral instruction, 
but this would be the only fair and proper procedure. 
A. Oral Instructions. 
The oral instructions of the Court are found (Rec., pp. 
129-134), and as stated occupy practically five pages of rec-
ord. In addition to the fact that it is contrary to the Vir-
ginia practice and a fair and impartial presentation of the 
law in an available and practical manner for the guidanee 
of the jury, and that it deprives the parties of an oppor-
tunity to make properly considered objections, the instruc-
tion in the instant case is fatally defective, in that it leaves 
out all referen~e to the matter of proximate cause and any 
principles under which the jury might consider this · ques-
tion, and is in any event, for reasons stated, a poor substi-
tute for written instructions, which would give proper prac-
tical instructions to the jury, and protect the interests of 
litigants. The instruction in terms (Rec., p. 131) tells the 
jury that they could recover against the defendants unless 
the accident was due wholly to the fault of Miles and that 
they might :find a verdict against the defendants, even though 
1\files mig·ht have been negligent, as his negligence would 
not be imputed to the plaintiff, if they should find also that 
Powell was at fault. It will be seen that this does not deal 
'vith the question of proximate cause, or give the jury any 
g·nide on that question. The instruction further. concluded 
that the whole question depends upon whether a rear light 
. ·was burning on the motorcycle, and that if not, then the jury 
were to decide whether the situation was such that none was 
required under the City Ordinance. Now here in the instruc-
t.ion is the proximate cause referred to. It is submitted 
that tl1e instruction of the Court was erroneous, in any event, 
in failing to instruct the jury on the subject of proximate 
cause, and to give them some guiding principles under which 
this ouestion should be determined. It in effect tells the jury 
that if they believe that the accident was the result of negli-
gence of both parties, regardless of when or how such negli-
gence affected the matter, or whether or proximate or re-
mote. the jury should find a verdict for the plaintiff. It is 
in effect an instruction directing the verdict on a partial 
view of the evidence, and on erroneous principles when ap-
plied thereto. 
So far as we can find, this Court has never passed directly 
on the question of giving· only oral instructions. See Booth's 
case, 4 Gratt. 525; Crump's case, 98 Va. 833, 23 S. E. 760. 
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We earnestly insist, however, that numerous pitfalls are 
presented when only oral instructions are given, and that 
our practice contemplates the giving of instructions which 
the jury may take when they retire to their room for con-
sidered deliberations in reaching a verdict. The giving of 
only oral instructions is not only contrary to practice, but is 
~xceedingly dangerous and necessarily prevents the jury from 
really considering the law as applicable to the facts. See 
DeJarnette's case, 75 Va. 867, at p. 877; DuPont v. Sneait, 
124 V a. 177 at p. 187-8. 
In New York, etc., R. Co. v. Thomas, 92 Va. 606, 609, 24 
S. E. 264, the Court recognized the fact that instructions in 
:writing- are carried by the jury to their room when they re-
tire to consider their verdict. It is submitted with only oral 
instrnctio·ns the jury· have no opportunity to consider the law 
fu the case and would have to go on their recollection of 'vhat 
the Court said, and could not possibly retain the finer points 
of instructions, when their only opportunity is limited to one 
hearing fron1 the bench. 
We will consider the decisions of this Court, with refer-
ence to the right of a party to have instructions given as of-
fered, when they properly present the law, under the next 
heading dealing with instructions offered and refused. 
B. Instructions offered and refused. 
As to ·the instructions offered, there are certain general 
principles applicable, and it "rill simplify matters to set out 
these general principles in the beginning. 
The principle is well settled that to refuse relevant in- , 
structions which rightly propound the law, is error. In dis-
cussing· this principle, this Court in the case of Gordon v. 
City of Rich'lnonrl, 83 Va. 436, 439, 2 S. E. 727, say~: 
''These instructions, asked for by the plaintiff, are rele~ 
vant to the evidence and correctly propound the Ia'v ap-
plicable to the case, and they should have been given to the 
jury, and the circuit court erred in refusing to give them. 
'To refuse relevant instructions which rightly propound the 
law, is error in the court below, for which the judgment must 
be revers-ed.' 4 Minor's Insts., Part I (1878), p. 875, citing 
Pickett v. Morr-is, 2 Wash. 255; Brooke v. Yo'U,n_q, B Rand. 
106; Dim'lneU v. Esk·ridge, 6 Munf. 311; Wills v. Washin.qton, 
6 ~funf. 592; Early v. Garland, 13 Gratt. 9, 14; B. db 0. R. R. 
Co. v. Polly, 14 Gratt. 468-9; B. & 0. R. R. Co. v. Laffertys, 
14 Gratt. 486-7; Sn~ith v. Carrington, 4 Cranch. 62. '' Va. R. 
& P. Co. v.· McDem1nick, 117 Va. 862, 86 S. E. 744. 
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It is equally as well settled that a litigant has the right to 
have his own instructions given, as he offers them, if they 
clearly and correctly state the law and are applicable to the 
facts of the case. In Bertha Zinc Co. v. lJ!lartin, 93 Va. 791, 
804, 22 S. E. 869, the Court said: 
''Instruction No. 2, offered by the plai'ntiff in error, cor-
rectly states the law and ought to have been given, and the 
refusal of the Court to give it was error, and reversible 
error, unless some other instruction given by the court cured 
it. A party has the right to have his own instruction given 
as he offers it, if it clearly and correctly states the law, and 
is applicable to the facts of the case. In Rosenba~tms v. 
Weeden, Johnson &; Co., 18 Gratt. at page 799, Judge Mon-
cure, in delivering the opinion of the court, says: 'A court 
is bound to give any instruction asked for by either party, 
which correctly expounds the law upon any evidence before 
the jury.' BaUo. &; Ohio R. R. Co. v. Polly, Woods &; Co., 
14 Gratt. 447, 468." 
See· also (;. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Stock, 104 Va. 97, at p. 110 
(Keith, P.). 
In tl1e instant case, the oral instruction of the Court not 
only did not cover all the points raised in the written in-
structions offered, but even where covered in whole or in part, 
were insufficient in that they gave no fair opportunity to the 
jury, who could not possibly retain the instruction in their 
1nind, to consider the legal principles. The trial Court did 
not specifically refuse a,ny instructions on account of error of 
law or inapplicability to the facts of the case, but refused 
all of thmn in mass for the sole stated reason that it consid-
ered the instructions too voluminous, and then gave an oral 
instruction which was in effect as voluminous as the written 
instructiO'ns offered, and which of course would not have the 
same value to the jury, which could not retain the instruc-
tion in mind. 
In this connection, the language of Judge Prentis in the 
case of Va. R:ailuJa11 dl; Po1.ver On. v. Burr, 145 Va. 338. 133 
S. E. 776, is peculiarly applicable. On page 346 of the opin-
ion it is stated: 
'' vVhile this court has discouraged the multiplication of 
instructions, it is certainly true in view of the sanctity of the 
verdicts that juries should be carefully informed bv the court 
as to the legal principles properly applicable.'' "' 
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In Burks' Pleading & Practice ( 3rd Ed.), page 464, the 
statement is as follows: 
''The duty of charging the jury generally is regarded in 
Virginia as a burden which counsel cannot impose upon the 
court. 'It has not been the practice in Virginia, as in Eng-
land, for the courts to charge the jury upon the law of the 
case, and it is not error to refuse to give such charge, or to 
refuse to instruct g·enerally upon the law of the case. If 
either party desire any specific instruction to be given, he 
has the rig·ht to ask it, and the court is bound to give it, 
provided it expounds the law correctly upon any evidence 
before the jury. A party cannot, by asking for an erroneous 
instruction, or, as I apprehend, by asking for a general in-
struction, devolve upon the court the duty of charging the 
jury on the law of the case. See Rosenbaums v. JtVeeden, 
Johnsm~ & Co., 18 Gratt. 785, 799.' " 
All of the above shows the actual practice and the 'visdom 
of that practice of giving· the written instructions to the jury. 
We will now take up the instructions offered on behalf 
of the defendants. 
INSTRUCTION A (Rec., p. 140). 
This instruction was a stock instruction on preponderance 
of evidence and proximate cause. Aside from the fact that 
the oral instruction is at best a poor and insufficient substi-
tute, for reasons stated, the oral instruction did not deal with 
the question of proximate cause, nor state to the jury that 
negligence, in order to justify a recovery, must be the proxi-
mate cause of the accident. Thus, this instruction w·as only 
partially covered by the oral instruction. .The instruction 
embodied only hornbook principles, and should have been 
given. See C. & 0. Ry. C'o. v. Crum, 140 Va. 333, 341, 125 S. 
E. 301. 
INSTRUCTION B (Rec., p. 140J. 
This was an instruction setting out the duties of Thomas 
Miles, the driver of the Ford automobile, to drive in a care-
ful and prudent manner, keep a proper lookout, keep his car 
under control, have p~oper brakes and lights, g·ive adequate 
and timely signals, and to drive in a careful manner and at a 
proper speed, in view of the conditions existing, and to re-
~ard highway signs, and charged the jury that if he had 
failed in these respects, or any of them, and such failure 
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was the sole proximate cause of the accident, then the plain-
tiff could not recover. It is axiomatic that this instruction 
is correct as a matter of law, and is specifically supported 
by the case ·of Sta.ndard Oil Co. v. Roberts, 130 Va., p. 532, 
107 S. E. 838; Lavenstein. v. 1l1.aile, 146 Va. 789·, 132 S. E. 844. 
The oral instruction only partially covered the points brought 
out in the instruction and did not deal at all with the ques-
tion of the proximate cause of the accident'. 
INSTRUCTION C (R.ec., p. 141). 
This instruction dealt specifically with the particular facts 
and circumstances existing· at the time, and charged the jury 
that if they believed that the situation and lighting were such 
so that both the street car and motorcycle were plainly visible 
to any one approaching, and that both had stopped and re-
lnained standing for an appreciable time, ample for Miles 
the driver of the Ford car, to see the situation by the exer-
cise of reasonable care, so that he 'vould have had ample 
time to have avoided the accidHnt, then, reg·ardless of whether 
the driver of the motorcycle or street car had been negli-
gent in stopping at the time and place, such negligence was 
not the proximate cause of the accident, but the intervening 
negligeooe of tl1e driver of the l\tliles car was the cause, and 
t.hey should find for the defendant. The failure to give this, 
of course, is subject to the same exceptions as noted with 
reference to Instructions A and B. It properly states the 
principles of law and was applicable to the specific facts. 
It presented the questions of remote and proximate cause, 
none of which were covered in the oral instruction given. 
The instruction itself is amply supported by authorities. 
See Barnes v. Ash1.vorth, 154 Va. 218, 153 S. E. 711; Kinsey 
v. Bn11gh, 157 Va. 407, 161 S. E. 41. It plainly should have 
been given under the general principles cited above. 
In the case of J(insey v. Brugh, last mentioned, the defend-
ant's car in the night time struck the plaintitff's buggy from 
behind. The defendant's lights were in good condition, yet 
he claimed that he did not see the plaintiff until he was with-
in a few feet of him, and contended that the failure of the 
plaintiff to carry a lighted lamp or lantern was the proximate 
cause of the injury. The Court, at pp. 411-412, said as fol-
lows: 
'' ( 4-6) It is elementary that a plaintiff seeking to recover 
damages for an injury caused by the negligence of the de-
fendants must himself be free from negligence; if it appears 
that the plaintiff's negligence has contributed as an efficient 
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cause to the injury the court will not undertake to balance 
the negligence of the respective parties for the purpose of de-
termining which is most at fault. This general rule, how-
ever, is subject to the qualification that where the negligence 
of. the defendant is the proximnte cause of the injury and 
that of the plaintiff the remote cause the plaintiff may re-
cover, notwithstanding his negligence. The court regards 
the immediate or· proximate cause which ·directly produces 
the injury, not the remote cause which may have antecedently 
contributed to it. If the defendant kne,v, or in the exercise 
qf ordinary care ought to have known, of the negligence of 
the plaintiff and could have avoided the accident, but failed 
to do so, the plaintiff is permitted to recover. SouJhern Ry. 
Co. v. Bailey, supra; Richm.ond Traction Co. v. Martin's 
Admr., 102 Va. 209, 45 S. E. 886; C. ct 0. Ry. Co. v. Corbin's 
Admr., 110 Va. 700, 67 S. E. 179." 
This Instruction C dealt with the specific facts of the case 
and the legal principles applicable thereto. The oral in-
struction was not only insufficient, for reasons already stated, 
but further did not deal with the questions raised in this in-
struction, and disregarded the distinctions between remote 
and proximate cause, a very pertinent and important ques-
tion in the case at bar. -
INSTRUCTION D (Rec., p. 142). 
This instruction is a generally accepted stock instruction. 
It was as follows : 
''The Court instructs the jury that it is not negligence to 
fail to take precautionary measures to prevent an injury 
which if taken, would l1ave prevented it, when the injury could 
not have reasonably been anticipated, and would not have 
happened but for the occurrence of exceptional circum-
stances.'' 
·The above instruction was g·iven and approved by the Court 
in the case of .Jfnrphy's Hotel v. Cuddy's Admr., 124 Va. 207, 
97 S. E. 794. . 
. The instruction was plainly applicable to the case, as it 
·was clear that the accident could not have been reasonably 
anticipated under the .circumstances. When Powell stopped 
in a plainly visible position, obvious to any one who might 
approach, he could not reasonably have anticipated that un-
der such conditions ·some one. would run into the motorcvcle 
:frotn behind. The point was not in any way covered in~ the 
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oral instruction given, and it is submitted that the instruction 
should have been given. 
INSTRUCTION E (Rec., p. 142). 
This instruction was offered tq deal with the special charge 
in the notice of motion that the defendants were negligent 
in blocking the street, and told the jury that if they believed 
from the evidence that the operator of the street car and 
motorcycle were confronted with a sudden emergency, in 
view of the doubt as to whether the cars could pass, and 
thereby temporarily blocked the street, and that this action 
was such as a person of ordinary prudence might have taken 
in a like situation, there was then no negligence in stopping 
the cars and blocking the street. . 
As shown above, the petitioners were entitled to have this 
instruction given, in response to a positive allegation in the 
notice of motion, which the jury of course had with them 
when they considered the case, which is not covered in the 
oral instruction (and even if covered would be insufficiently 
so, for reasons stated), except in a negative way. The oral 
instruction limited the question of negligence to the pres-
e·nce or absence of the rear light on the motorcycle, and 
thereby negatively eliminated the charge of negligence from 
blocking- the street. Petitioners, however, were entitled to have 
this defense put in positive form and in: such shape that the 
jury could take it with them when considering the case. As 
it was, they had the charge of negligence from blocking the 
street with them, and nothing to deny that such was negli-
gence, unless they could remember the details of the five 
page oral instructions of the Court, after hearing it once. 
See C. & 0. Radlu·ay Co. v. Crum, 140 Va. 333, 338, 125 S. E. 
301. It is submitted that the instruction should have been 
g1ven. 
INSTRU·CTION F (Rec., p. 143). 
This instruction told the jury that there was no negligence 
in parking· the ~otorcycle without rear lights, if there wa:; 
sufficient light so that the circumstances brought it within 
the exception provided for in the City Code. This instruction 
was covered in effect in the oral instruction, but for reasons 
already stated, the oral instruction was absolutely inade-
quate, as it could not possibly be remembered by the jury, and 
further, petitioners were authorized to have the instruction 
given as offered in a positive form for the guidance of the 
jury. 
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INSTRUCTION G (Rec., p. 143). 
This instruction simply told the jury that they should con~ 
sider the case under the evidence and instructions and should 
not allow any question of sytnpathy to enter into their delib-
erations. It was not covered in any way in the oral instruc-
tion. 
The instruction is supported by authority. See C. & 0. Ry. 
C'o. v. Schwartz, 115 Va. 723, 80 S. E. 568. It was particu~ 
lady applicable in this case, fron1 the fact that the plaintiff 
was a young- g-irl under the age of twenty-one, 'vhose in-
juries consisted of cuts on the face, which would leave per-
manent scars and would detract from the plaintiff's appear· 
ance and beauty. It is submitted that it should have been 
given. 
· With reference to all of the above instructions offered and 
refused, attention is again called to the general principle that 
where an instruction is offered and properly presents the 
law and is applicable to the facts of the case, it should be 
g-iven, and it is error to refuse it, unless covered by some 
other instruction, and in the instant case, even where the 
instructions were covered wholly or partially, the oral in-
struction was i'nsufficient for reasons stated. 
The instant case shows particularly the dangers of giving 
merely oral instructions. It cannot be expected that a Court 
in a more or less exten1porary manner, and in an oral in· 
struction, can. cover, in any effective manner, the legal points 
properly applicable to a case, even if the jury could be ex-
pected to retain the instruction in their minds, as they clearly 
could not be expected to do, in a. case such as this, where the 
oral instructions occupied five pages of· the record. The jury 
could not possibly retain and apply the legal principles in 
any intelligent way. 
It is contended that under the positive testimony and physi-
cal facts and circumstances, tl1e Court should have stricken 
out the evidence of the plaintiff, or set aside the verdict and 
enter judgment for the defendants. Even if this be not true, 
the defendants were clearlv entitled to have the questions aris-
ing under the evidence, and as set out in the instructions of-
fered, submitted to the jury, particularly the question as to 
proximate cause a·nd remote cause, and the principles of law 
under which these points should be decided, and the further 
question of whether under the circumstances the accident 
could have been reasonably anticipated from any actions of 
the driver of the motorcycle. None of these questions were 
submitted to the jury. 
It is further submitted that the Court was clearly in error 
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in giving merely oral instructions and in refusing each and 
all of the instructions offered. That being true, if the Court 
should not agree with our position that the evidence should 
have been stricken, or the verdict should have been set aside 
and judgment entered for the defendant, it would then be-
come the duty of this .Court, in view of the error in the ques-
tion of instructions, to examine into the evidence and enter 
final judgment upon the merits (Code Section 6365). In this · 
case it is submitted that under the evidence there was no 
proper basis for a verdict against the defendant, and that 
final judgment should be entered in this Court for the defend-· 
ant. See Atlantic, etc., Railway Co. v. Walkup Co., 132 Va. 
386, 112 S. E. 663; Quee~~~ ln.<;. Co. v. Perkinson, 129 Va. 216, 
105 S. E. 580; Duncan v. Carson, 12-7 Va. 306, 103 S. E. 665, 
105 S. E. 62. There are numerous other decisions but the 
above would seem to be sufficient. 
OON·CLUSION. 
It is respectfully submitted that the lower cou1·t was in error 
in failing to strike the evidence, in giving merely oral in-
structions, in refusing each and all of the instructions offered 
by the defenda:nt, as set out above, in refusing to set aside 
tl1e verdict and enter judgment for the defendant. In con-
sideration of which, the defendant prays that the decision 
of the lower court may be reversed and that final judgment 
may be entered for the defendants, or that in any event, if 
the Court be of opinion that this should not be done, that 
the decision should be reversed and the cause remanded to 
the Corporation Court for the City of Lynchburg, to be heard 
npon principles of law as may be provided by this Court in 
its opinion, and to that end that a writ of error and S'ltper-
sedeas may be awarded to the judgment of the Corporation 
Court for the City of Lynchburg. 
Counsel for petitioners desire to state orally their reasons 
why the writ of error prayed for should be granted, and in 
the event the same be granted, will use this petition as their 
opening brief. 
A copy of this petitio'n was, in pursuance of Rule 2 of this 
Court, as amended, delivered toW. H. Jordan, Attorney for 
the plaintiff, on the 15th day of May, 1935. 
Respectfully, 
S. F. PRATT and 
MELVIN 0. POWELL. 
By CASKIE & FROST, Attorneys. 
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The undersigned attorneys practicing in' the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that in our opinion 
the judgment complained of in the foregoing petition should 
be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State 
of Virginia. 
Respectfully, 
J AS. R. CASKIE, 
E. l\iARSHALL FROST. 
The undersigned attorney for Janie F. 1\files, an infant, 
who sues by, etc., acknowledges receipt of a copy of the fore-
going petition this 15th day of May, 1935. 
W. H. JORDAN, Attorney. 
Received May 17, 1935. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerlr. 
June 18, 1935. Writ of error and s1.tpersedeas awarded by 
the court. Bond $2,500. 
M. B. W. 
Received June 19, 1935. 
M. B. W. 
RECORD 
VIRGINIA : 
Pleas before the Honorable Aubrey E. Strode, judge of 
the corporation court or the city of Lynchburg, at the court-
house thereof, on tl1e first day of April, 1935, and in the 
159th year of the Commonwealth. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit, on the 13th day 
of February, 1935, Janie F. ~files, an infant, who sues by 
Wiley S. :Miles, her father and next friend, by W. H. Jordan, 
Esq., her attorney, caused to be returned to the clerk's ·office 
of the corporation court of the city of Lynchburg her notice 
of motion for judgment a~ainst Lynchburg Traction & Light 
CoJ!1pany, a corporation, S. Frank Pratt and l\felvin 0. Pow-
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ell, which said notice had been duly served on said defend-
ants, and is in the words and figures following, to-wit: 
To Lynchburg Traction & Light Company, a Corporation, 
S. Frank Pratt and J\ielvin 0. Powell: 
. Please Take Notice That on the first day of the March 
Term, 1935, of the Corporation ·Court for the City of Lynch-
burg, State of Virginia, the undersigned Janie F. Miles, an 
infant, who sues by Wiley S. 1\1iles, her father and next friend 
(hereinafter called the plaintiff), will move the said court for 
judgment against you and each of you (herernafter called the 
defendants) in the sum of Five Thousand ($5,000.00) Dollars 
as damages by reason of the following facts, to-wit: 
page 2 ~ That heretofore, to-wit, on the 24th day of De-
cember, 1934, the defendant Lynchburg Traction & 
Light Company was the owner of a certain street car, which 
said street car was then under the care, government and di-
rection of a certain servant of the said defendant company, 
who was then acting for the said defenda·nt company, within 
the scope of his employment and authority, in driving the 
said street car in and along a certain public street of the 
said city, to-wit, Campbell Avenue, and in stopping the said 
street car and permitting the same to remain standing in and 
npon the said public street; that on the day and year last 
aforesaid the defendant S. Frank Pratt was the owner of a 
certain motorcycle and side car, which said motorcycle and 
side car was then under the care, government and direction 
of a certain servant of the defendant S. Frank Pratt, to-wit, 
one 1\ielvin 0. Powell, who was then acting for the defendant 
S. Frank Pratt, within the scope of his employment and au-
thority, in driving· the said motorcycle and side car in and 
along- the said public street of the said city and stopping the 
said motorcycle and side car and permitting the same to re-
main standing· in a:nd upon the said public street; that the 
said Melvin 0. Powell t4en and there, as the servant of the 
said S. ·Frank Pratt, had the care, government and direction 
of the said motorcycle and side car, as aforesaid; that on 
the day and year aforesaid, while the said street car and the 
said motorcycle and side car were under the care, government 
and direction of the persons aforesaid, the plaintiff was law-
fully riding along and upon the said public street as a passen-
ger in a certain automobile, and that while the plaintiff was 
so riding as a passenger in the said automobile, the 
page 3 ~ defendant company, then and there by its said serv-
ant, so carelessly, negligently and improperly drove, 
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governed, directed, stopped and permitted to remain stand-
ing its_ said street car upon the said public gtr·eet, and the de-
fendant S. Frank Pratt, then and there by his said servant, 
so carelessly, negligently and improperly dr0yve, governed, 
directed, stopped and pern1itted to ren1ain stantling upon the 
said public street the said motorcycle and side car, and the 
said J\!Ielvin 0. Powell so carelessly, negligently and improp-
erly drove, governed, directed, stopped and permitted to re-
main standing upon the said public street the said motorcycle 
and side car, that by and through the carelessness, negligence 
and improper conduct of the defendant company, as aforesaid, 
by its said servant in its behalf, and by and through the care-
lessness, negligence and improper conduct of the said de-
fendant S. Frank Pratt, as aforesaid, by his said servant in 
his behalf, and by and through the carelessness, negligence 
and improper conduct of the said Melvin 0. Powell, as afore-
said, the said automobile was caused to run into and strike 
against the said street car and the said motorcycle and side 
car with great force and violence, and as a result thereof 
the plaintiff was thrown with great force and violence against 
and upon the interior of the said automobile and the wind-
shield of the said automobile was crushed and broken and 
parts of the said windshield, crushed and broken as afore-
said, were thrown against and upon the head, face, hands, arms 
and body of the plaintiff and the plaintiff's head, face, hands, 
arms and body were severely and grievously bruised, cut 
and lacerated thereby, causing the plaintiff serious and per-
manent injuries and disfigurements, and by means 
page 4 ~ of the premises the plaintiff was then and there 
greatly bruised, hurt, cut, lacerated, wounded and 
disfigured, and became and was sick, sore, lame, disordered 
and disfigured, and so continued for a long space of time, 
to-wit, hitherto, during· all which time the plaintiff has suf-
fered great pain, humiliation and distress of mind on ac-
count of the said bruises, lacerations, cuts and disfigurements, 
and has been hindered and prevented from attending to her 
regular business, and will be henceforth subjected to great 
pain, humiliation and distress of mind because of the perma-
nent injuries and disfigurements aforesaid; and also, by rea-
son of the premises, the plaintiff was obliged to pay out and 
expend, and hath necessarily paid out and expended, divers 
. sums of money, in the whole amounting to a large sum, to-
with, $200.00, in and about the endeavoring to get and be-
come healed and cured of the said wounds, hurt, lacerations, 
disorder and disfig-urements. 
To the damage of the plaintiff in the sum of Five Thousand 
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($5,000.00) Dollars. And therefore she institutes this action 
of trespass on the case. 
Respectfully, 
. JANIE F. MILES, 
Who sues by Wiley s~ Miles, her father 
and next friend. 
W. ·H. JORDAN, 
Lynchburg, Virginia, January 26, 1935. 
W. H. JORDAN, p. q. · 
Lynchburg, Va. 
By Counsel. 
At another day, to-wit, at Lynchburg Corporation Court, 
~Iarch 4th, 1935. 
This day came the parties by their attorneys, and on mo-
tion of the plaintiff it is ordered that this motion 
page 5 ~ be docketed. On motion of the defendants it is 
ordered that the plaintiff file within seven days a 
bill of the particulars of her -claim, and on motion of the 
plaintiff it is ordered that the .defendants file within fourteen 
days a statement of their gt_ounds of def~nse. 
At another day, to-wit, at Lynchburg Corporation Court, 
l:Iarch 19th, 1935. 
This dav came the parties by their attorneys, and the de-
fendants filed by leave of court their separate demurrers to 
the plaintiff's notice of motion for judgment, together with 
statements of the grounds thereof, in which demurrers the 
plaintiff joined, and the same being argued, the court over-
ruled said demurrers, and the defendants by their attorneys 
excepted. And the plaintiff offered to file a bill of the par-
ticulars of her claim, to the filing; of which the defendants 
by their attorneys objected, and said objections being argued, 
the court overruled said objections, and said defendants by 
their attorneys excepted, and said bill of particulars was filed 
by leave of court, and said defendants filed their separate 
pleas of not guilty, and separate statements of their grounds 
of defense, to which the plaintiff replies generally, and prays 
that tl1e same be inquired of by the country, and the defend-
ants likewise, and said parties demanding a jury, there came 
a jury, to-wit, R. A. Barnes, C. S. Harvey, A. P. Marsh, J. H. 
McLaughlin, H. A .. ~Htchell, E. M. Shaner and E. D. Rhodes, 
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who were sworn to try the issue joined, and hav:ing heard 
the evidence of the plaintiff, the court doth strike out the 
evidence as to the defendant, the Lynchburg Trac-
page 6 ~ tion and Light Company, as insufficient to support 
. a verdict against said defendant, and the plaintiff 
by her attorney excepted, and the jury having heard the evi-
dence and argument of counsel, retired to their room to con-
sider of their verdict to be given in the premises, and after 
some time returned jn.to court, and not having agreed in a 
verdict, were adjourned until tomorrow morning at nine-
fifteen o'clock. 
DEMURRER OF LYNCHBURG TRACTION & LIGHT 
00~1:PANY 
The defendant, Lynchburg Traction & Light Company, 
says that the notice of motion in this action is not sufficient 
in law, and states the grounds of this its demurrer to be as 
follows: 
The facts and circumstances stated in said notice of mo-
tion show no negligence on the part of said defendant. Said 
notice of motion alleges that said defendant street car was 
stopped upon a street in the City of Lynchburg and that there-
by the automobile in 'vhich plaintiff was riding was caused 
to run into and strike said street car, which allegation fails 
to show actionable •neglig·ence on the part of said defendant, 
but on the contrary shows that the negligence of the driver 
of said automobile was the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's 
injuries. 
LYNCHBURG TRACTION & LIGHT COMPANY. 
By Counsel. 
BARI{SDALE & ABBOTT, p. d. 
DEMURRER OF S. FRANK PRATT AND MELVIN 0. 
POWELL. 
The defendants, S. Frank Pratt and l\felvin 0. Powell de-
mur to the notice of motion and bill of particulars, and say -
that the same are not sufficient in law, and for the 
page 7 ~ grounds of demurrer say: 
· .1. That it does not appear from the aflegations that the al-
leged negligence on the part of these defendants was the 
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proximate cause of the accident, or the proximate cause of 
the injuries complained of. 
2. That it appears from the allegations that, even if there 
were negligence o·n the part of these defendants, such negli-
gence was the remote and not the proximate cause of the ac-
·cident. · 
PLAINTIFF'S BILL OF PARTICULARS. 
The plaintiff states as her bill of particulars: 
(1) That on the nig·ht of December 24, 1934, she was a 
pas.senger in an automobile which was proceeding lawfully 
in a southerly direction on Campbell. Avenue, near and at the 
intersection of Seventeenth Street, in the City of Lynchburg, 
Virginia; that a street car of the defendant company, under 
the direction and co·ntrol of one of its servants and headed 
north, was standing still on the tracks of the said company 
on the said Campbell Avenue at or near its intersection ·with 
said Seventeenth Street; that a motorcycle and side car, owned 
by the defendant Pratt and under the 'direction and control 
of the defendant Powell, headed in a southerly direction was 
standing still, or 'vas slowly in motion, on the said Campbell 
A venue by the side of the said street car, and without any 
tail lig·ht on the said motorcycle and side car; that the said 
street car and the said motorcycle and side car unlawfully 
and negligently blocked and obstructed the right-of-
page 8 ~ way of the plaintiff and the automobile in which she 
was riding along· and upon the said avenue and 
caused the said automobile to come into collision with the 
said street car and the said motorcycle and side car ; that as 
a result of the said collision the plaintiff was grievously 
shaken. bruised, cut and wounded. 
(2) That the palintiff's injuries consisted of bruises, cuts 
and wounds to her person; that the most grievous wound 
sustained by the plaintiff "ras a cut or gash on the side of 
her head and face which necessitated twelve stitches taken 
in it by her attending physician; that the last mentioned cut 
or 'vound, although skillfully treated by a competent physi-
cian. has left and will leave a permanent and disfiguring scar 
on the side of the plaintiff's head and face. 
(3) That the plaintiff, because of the said injuries, was 
c:>onfined to the Memorial Hospital for several days, incurring 
a hospital bill of $8.00; that the plaintiff was forced to en-
g-age the _ _services of a practicing physician to treat .and heal 
the said wound, incurring an expense of $10.00 to Dr. J. H. 
Rawlings; that after leaving the said hospital the plaintiff 
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was forced to wear awkward and inconvenient bandages on 
the last mentioned wound and cut, while the same was heal-
ing; that the plaintiff was forced to expend for medical sup-
plies, &c., the sum of $1.00 in the treatn1ent of the said cut 
and wound; that because of the said injuries the plaintiff 
was unable. to attend to her regular business or calling for 
a period of, to-wit, two weeks, and thereby sustained dam-
age of the loss of her salary during that period. 
W. I-I. JORDAN, p. q. 
Lynchburg, Virginia, l\Iarch 8, 1935. 
page 9 ~ Objection No. 1 of Lynchburg Traction and Light 
Company to filing· of plaintiff's bill of particular~. 
The defendant, Lynchburg Traction & Light Company, ob-
jects to the filing· of plaintiff's bill of particulars upon the 
ground that it is insufficient in law in that it states no facts 
or circumstances 'vhich constitute negligence on the part 
of the said defendant, Lynchburg Traction & Light Com-
pany, and therefore moves the court to strike out said bill 
of particulars. 
LYNCHBURG TRACTION & LIGHT CO., 
By Counsel. 
BARKSDALE & ABBOT, p. d. 
Objection No. 2 of Lynchburg Traction and Light Com-
pany to filing of plaintiff's bill of particulars. 
The defendant, Lynchburg Traction & Light Company, 
moves the court to exclude any evidence offered in respect 
to the matter contained in plaintiff's bill of particulars upon 
the ground that said ·bill of particulars is insufficient in law 
in that it states no facts and circumstances which constitute 
negligence upon the part of the said defendant, Lynchburg 
Traction & Light Company. 
LYNCHBURG TRACTION & LIGHT CO., 
By CounseL 
BARKSDALE & ABBOT, p. d. 
Objection of S. Frank Pratt and 1\felvin 0. Powell to filing 
of plaintiff's bill of particulars. 
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The defendants, S. Frank Pratt and Melvin 0. Powell, ob-
ject ot the filing of the plaintiff's bill of particulars on the 
ground that it fails to set forth with reasonabl~ 
page 10} certainty and p~rticularity any specific act of neg-
ligence charged and sufficient facts with reference 
thereto~ to enable the Court to say that if the facts set forth 
be proven substantially as alleged, the defendant has been 
g·uilty of some specific a~t of negligence, for which the plain-
tiff is entitled to recover. 
PLEA OF NOT GUILTY OF LYNCHBURG TRACTION 
& LIGHT COMPANY. 
The said defendant, Lynchburg Traction & Light Company, 
by its attorney, comes and says that it is not guilty of the 
premises in this action laid to its charge, in manner and form 
as the plaintiff hath complained, and of this the said defend-
ant puts itself upon the country. 
LYNCHBURG TRACTION & LIGHT CO., 
· By Counsel. 
BARKSDALE & ABBOT, p. d. 
GROUNDS OF DEFENSE OF LYNCHBURG TRACTION 
& LIGHT COMPANY. 
The defendant, Lynchburg Traction & Light Company, as 
and for its grounds of defense, will rely upon the follow-
ing: 
That it was not guilty of the acts of negligence, or any 
of them, as alleged in plaintiff's notice of motion and bill 
of particulars ; 
That the fact that defendant's street car was standing 
still at the time of the collision was not by reason of any 
negligence on the part of this def.endant, or its agent, but at 
and before the time of said collision defendant's agent was 
exercising ordinary and reasonable care; 
That the negligence of the driver of the automobile in which 
the plaintiff was riding was the sole proximate cause of her 
injury; that even if this defendant's agent was guilty of 
negligence, which it denies, its negligence was not 
page 11 } a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury; 
That even if this defendant's agent was negli-
g-ent, which it denies, the driver of the automobile in which 
the plaintiff was riding- was guilty of contributory negligence 
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in that he heedlessly and recklessly drove the said automo-
bile head-on into defendant's stationary street car, when he . 
saw, or, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have seen, 
said street car and avoided such collision, and that the plain-
tiff was chargeable with the negligence of said driver; 
That the plaintiff was chargeable with the negligence of the 
said driver of the automobile in which she was riding, be-
cause plaintiff and said drive1· were engaged in a joint enter-
prise; and 
That the plaintiff was chargeable with the negligence of 
the driver of the automobile in which she was riding, because 
said driver was the ag·ent of the plaintiff. 
~YNCHBURG TRACTION & LIGHT COMPANY, 
By Counsel. 
BARKSDALE ~ ABBOT, p. d. 
PLEA O:E, NOT GUILTY OF S. FRANK PRATT AND 
. MELVIN 0. POWELL. 
The defendants, S. Frank Pratt and Melvin 0. Powell, by 
their attorney, come and say that they are not guilty of the 
premises in this action laid to their charge in manner and 
form as the plaintiff hath complained. .A:nd of this the de-
fendants put themselves upon the country. 
GROUNDS OF DE-FENSE OF S. :FRANK PRATT AND 
MELVIN 0. POWELL. 
The defendants, S. Frank Pratt and Melvin 0. Powell rely 
upon the folloWing as their defense to the above action: 
page 12 ~ 1st. That they deny each and every one of the 
negligent acts charged in the notice of motion. 
2nd. That they were not guilty of any negligence which was 
a proximate cause of the accident, and they deny that the 
accident was the result of any negligence on their part. 
3rd. That the accident was solely due to the negligence 
of Thomas lHles, in whose automobile Janie F. Miles was 
ridi·ng, in that the said Thomas ~files drove the said auto-
mobile. at the time of the accident in a careless and reckless 
manner; failed· to give adequate and timely signals, as pre-
scribed by law; failed to keep a proper lookout for vehicles 
lawfully occupying the street; was exceeding a reasonable 
speed under the circumstances and traffic conditions obtain-
ing at the time; was driving- with inadequate brakes and 
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lights; and did not have the said automobile under proper 
care and control. 
4th. That the defendants were presented with a sudden 
emergency not created by any act of negligence on their part, 
and acted as reasanable and prudent men might have and 
probably would have acted under the circumstances confront-
ing- them. 
5th. That the negligence of the driver Thomas Miles was 
imputable to Janie F. J\!Iiles, in that occupants of the Miles 
automobile were engaged in a joint enterprise. 
6th. That at the time of the accident Thomas Miles was 
the servant or agent of Janie F. :Miles, that the accident was 
occasioned or contributed to by the negligence of Thomas F. 
Miles, and therefore the plaintiff cannot recover in this ac-
tion. 
7th. That the injury complained of was not oc-
page 13 ~ casioned by the accident in . question. 
8th. That if the defendants should be deemed 
guilty of any negligence, which negligence they deny, the de-
fendants expressly rely on the contributory negligence of 
Janie F. ~files, in that (a) she continued to ride with the said 
Thomas Miles, well knowing the manner in which the auto-
mobile was being operated as set out in No. 3rd above, and 
failed to make any protest or leave the said automobile; {b) 
in failing to exercise reasonable care generally for her own 
safety. 
The defendants will rely upon any defense permissible un-
der their plea of the g·eneral issue, and reserve the right to 
add to, amend, or modify the foregoing grounds of defense in 
any particular. 
S. FRANK PRATT, 
MELVIN 0. POWELL. 
By CASKIE & FROST, p. d. 
At another day, to-wit, at Lynchburg Corporation Court, 
¥arch 20th, 1935. 
This day came the parties by their attorneys, and the jury 
sworn on yesterday for the trial of this controversy appeared. 
accordin~ to their adjournment, and after viewing the prem-
ises in the presence of the court and counsel, were again sent 
to their room to conside1; of their verdict to be given in the 
premises, and after some time returned into court with the 
following· verdict, to-wit: "We the jury find for the de-
. fendant, Lynchburg Traction and Light Co., and we the jury 
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find for the plaintiff against S. Frank Pratt and 
page 14 ~ Melvin 0. Powell the amount of Fifteen Hundred 
Dollars as damages. Edg·ar M:. Shaner, Fore-
Juan.'' Thereupon the defendants, S. Frank Pratt and Mel-
vin 0. Powell, by their attorneys, moved the court to set aside 
said verdict as to them on the gTound that it is contrary to 
the la-w and the evidence, because there is no negligence 
shown to be the proximate cause of the accident, because the 
. verdict is excessive, and for the following reasons: the fail-
ure of the court to strike out the bill of particulars for the 
reasons heretofore assigned, for the refusal to admit evi-
dence, for the refusal to strike out the evidence at the end 
of the testimony in the case, and for the refusal of the court. 
to give instructions offered by the defendants, and the giving 
of oral instructions in lieu thereof, which said motion is set 
down for argument on the 28th day of March, 1935, at nine 
o'clock A. M. And it is considered by the court that the plain~ 
tiff take nothing by her notice of motion as against the de-
fendant, Lynchburg Traction and Light Company, but for 
her false clamor in this respect, be in mercy, &c., and that 
the defendant, Lynchburg Traction and Light Company, go 
thereof without day. 
page 15 } And now at this day, to-wit, at Lynchburg Cor-
poration Court, Aprillst, 1935, the date first here-
inbefore mentioned. 
This day came the parties by their attorneys, and the de-
fendants' motion to set aside the verdict of the jury ren-
dered in this case on the 20th day of March, 1935, having been 
fully argued, the court overruled said motion, and the de-
fendants by their attorneys excepted. It is therefore con-
sidered by the court that the plaintiff recover against the 
said defendants, S. Frank Pratt and Melvin ·0. Powell, the 
sum of $1,500.00, the damages by the jury in the~r verdict 
aforesaid ascertained and assessed, with legal interest thereon 
from the 20th day of March, 1935, until paid, and her costs 
by her about her motion in this behalf expended. 
At the instance of said defendants by their attorneys who 
intimated their intention to apply for a writ of error and 
supersedeas, the court doth order that execution of said judg-
ment be suspended for a period of sixty days, upon condition 
that said defendants, or some one for them, execute before 
the clerk of this court a proper suspending bond in the pen-
alty of $200.00, conditioned according to law. 
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page 16} STIPULATION. 
It is stipulated between counsel for the respective parties 
to the above litigation that the Clerk need not copy any of 
the exhibits introduced in evidence into the record, but may 
deliver the originals without keeping copies to the counsel 
for S. F. Pratt and l\ielvin 0. Powell. 
It is further stipulated that counsel for S. F. Pratt and 
Melvin 0. Powell will present the original exhibits to the 
Supreme Court of Appeals with their petition for a writ of 
error and super.~edeas, and in the event such writ- of error 
and supersedeas -is.awarded by the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia, the said counsel for S. F. Pratt and Melvin 0. 
Powell shall cause to be made copies of the exhibits to be at-
tached to tlte official records of the cause. 
April lOth, 1935. 
W. H. JORDAN, 
Attorney for Janie F. Miles, who sues, etc. 
CASKIE & FROST, 
Attorneys for S. F. Pratt and Melvin 0. Powell. 
page 17 ~ D·R. J. HEN·RY RAWLINGS, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAl\tfi.NATION. 
By 1\tir. Jordan: 
Q. You are Dr. J. H. Rawlings, a practicing physician in 
tl1e City of Lynchburg, I believe. _ 
A. I am. 
Q. Doctor, did you have occasion to treat Miss Janie Miles, 
the plaintiff in this case, on December 24th for certajn in-
juries? 
A. Immediately after the accident, yes, sir. 
Q. Please explain to the jury the nature of her injury. 
A. She was brought in the Memorial Hospital directly after 
the accident. She had received a very severe cut on the side 
of her face which vou will be able to see the scar of. It was 
very deep, and through the cheek. It was a very deep and 
bad cut. She lost some blood. She had other minor abra-
Rions and bruises and was right much shocked. I had to give 
her an anaesthetic and the wound was sewed up. Of course 
there was some dirt in tl1e wound and at the time I thought 
she 'vould have a bad scar. She has got a disfigurement which 
will be permanent. The only permanent disability that she 
received so far as I could ascertain is this disfigurement, 
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this scar. She stayed in the hospital some time. I am not 
exactly certain of the days, but one or two days. 
page 18 ~ Q. Did you treat her after that, doctor! 
A. Yes, sir. She came to my office and I took 
the stitches out in my office. 
Q. Do you recall how many stitches there were? 
A. Quite a number. It was a very deep, ugly wound. 
Q. Over what period of time were you treating the wound, 
if you recall Y 
A. I am not certain, but I should say· about two weeks. 
Q. During that time did it or not have to be bandaged? 
A. Yes, sir, it had to be bandaged to be protected. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Barksdale : 
Q. Doctor, won't that scar become better and diminish in 
timet 
A. To a very slight extent. It is a very bad scar. Scars 
do fade out some but this scar will be permanent. She will 
always have a scar. 
Q. But it '.vill fade out to some extent Y 
A. To some extent. 
Q. There was no infection following it? · 
A. No, there was no infection. There was dirt in the wound 
but it was washed out carefully with .ether and she got no 
infection. 
Q. The result was generally good, wasn't itT 
A. The result was fair. People differ in the way in which 
they scar. Some persons get a scratch and they 
page 19 ~ will get a proliferation of scar tissue. She has got 
a right bad scar. 
Q. I believe you say that that is the only permanent in-jury. . 
A. That is the only permanent injury that I know of that 
she received. 
The witness stands aside. 
MISS JANE AR~iSTRONG; 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
.DIRECT EXAJ\IIINATION. 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. You are Miss ,Jane Armstrong? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where do you work! 
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A. I am a nurse. 
Q. Were you or were you not with :Miss Janie Miles on 
Christmas Eve nig·ht just past at the time of this automobile 
accident! 
A. Yes, sir, I was with her. 
Q. Please tell the court and the jury just how it happened 
in your own way. 
A. Well, we were going home for Christmas and were going 
out towards Fairview Heights in Lynchburg. 
Q. Who was with you¥ 
A. :Niiss lliles and Mr. Thomas ~files, and the 
page 20 } street car was coming towards us, as well as I un-
derstood, and we were going down to the intersec-
tion and just as we got to the intersection we saw the street 
car and we didn't see any motorcycle at all by it so Mr. Miles 
thought he could go past the street car and not until we,-
By Mr. Barksdale (interposing): We object to her testi-
mony as to what somebody else thought and move that it be 
stricken out. 
By the Court: That is stricken -out. 
1\{r. Jordan (continues): 
·Q. Tell how it appeared to ·you; not what ·somebody els~ 
thought. 
A. Well, anyway we were passing the street car, or attempt-
ing to pass the street car, and not until we were just on it did 
I see the motorcycle, and he attempted, I think, to go be-
tween the street car and the motorcycle and he put on his · 
brakes but it was too late and he struck the front end of 
the street car. I didn't know at the time he had struck the 
motorcycle at all, and we could not see the motorcycle. For 
o'ne thing the street car lights sort of obstructed our view and 
there was no tail light on the motorcycle. 
Q. Are you sure there was no tail light on the motorcycle Y 
f~. There was not any tail light on it. 
page 21 ~ By the Court: 
Q. Was the motorcycle headed away from you or 
towards you T 
A. It was headed the same way we were and was in front 
of us. 
Mr. Jordon (continues): 
Q. Was the headlight of the street car burning or not Y 
A. It was burning. · 
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Q. You were going in the direction of the street car and the 
street car was standing still facing you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did or did not the headlight of the street car interfere 
with your vision of any objects around the street carY 
A. Well, it' interfered with it because I didn't see the 
motorcycle at all until we were right on it. 
Q. If there had been a tail light on the motorcycle could 
you have seen it Y 
A. I am sure 've could have. 
Q. Miss Armstrong, could you tell us or not bow fast the 
automobile in which you were riding was traveling? 
A. The car wasn't going fast at all. I would say between 
twenty and twenty-five. 
Q. You feel certain it wasn't going at a. greater rate of 
speed than that? 
A. I am sure it 'vasn 't going faster. 
Q. Where had you gotten in the carY 
page 22 ~ A. We all got in the car at Federal Street. My 
home is on Federal Street and J\!Iiss J\!Iiles and 
I got in there. 
Q. In the eight hundred block on Federal Street 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. From the time you got in the car in the eight hundred 
block on Federal Street until the time you got to the place of 
the accident had the driver, Thomas Miles, driven fast or reck-
lesslyY 
By Mr. Frost: We object to that question. It has nothing 
to do with what he was doingr at the time of the accident. 
By Mr. Jordan: Your Honor please, they make as one of 
the grounds of their defense that this plaintifr was traveling 
in an automobile which this young man had driven carelessly 
and recklessly and that it was her duty to have gotten out of 
the automobile and protested. Now, we have the right to 
ask her if there 'vas any such evidence of recklessness prior 
to that time if they expect to set up that defense. 
By the Court: What have you to say to that, ~{r. Frost 1 
By Mr. Frost: I don't know that the question was ad-
dressed to that defense we were making. If that is its pur-
pose it is admissible. 
Mr. Jordan (continues) : 
Q. From the time you got in the automobile on Federal 
Street, in the eight hundred block, out to the time 
page 23 ~ of the accident had there been or not any reckless 
driving on the part of M1·. Thomas Miles Y 
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A. No, sir. 
Q. Had he driven at a fast rate of speed from Federal 
Street out to the point of the accident or not f 
A. No, I shouldn't say so. He was going just slow all the 
way. He 'vas being very careful. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Frost: 
Q. Miss Armstrong, where did you state you lived~ 
A. On Federal Street, 813. 
Q. Wha.t time did Mr. Miles come for you, do you recall Y 
A. A little after ten. We got off from work at nine and 
'vent over there and it 'vas a little aft-er ten. 
Q. Who got in the automobile then at the time you started 
out? 
A. Miss Miles and I. Mr. Thomas Miles was waiting for 
us in the car. 
Q. Where were you sitting! 
A.. In the middle. 
Q. Miss Janie 1\IIiles was sitting on your right f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. All three in the front seat! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What kind of t~, car was it? Do you recall that Y 
A. A Chevrolet I think. No, she says it was a 
page 24 } Ford. I know it is a small car. 
Q. It was a sedan, was it not? 
A. It was two-seated. 
Q. Yet you three were riding on the front seat Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Which way did you go after you left the eight hundred 
block on Federal Street? 
A. We went out to 11th, up 11th to Polk, out Polk to 12th 
nnd out 12th to Campbell.A.venue. I am pretty sure that was 
the way it was. · 
Q. Where were you going? 
A. Down to Miss Miles' home in Campbell County. 
Q. Where is that? 
A. At Seneca, Virginia. 
Q. You state that this man with this distance to go was 
not driving fast at that time of night f 
A. No, sir, he was not. 
Q. He was not driving fast f 
.A. No, sir. 
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Q. You wouldn't attempt to say at what rate of speed he 
was going? 
A. From what I know of driving, and I have been in cars 
a great deal, he wasn't going over twenty-five miles an hour, 
between twenty and twenty-five. 
Q. Do you drive an automobile yourself! 
A. No, sir, but I have been in them a lot and that was my 
idea. 
page 25} Q. Do you reca-ll on Campbell Avenue the two 
bridges that go over Campbell Avenue. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Didn't you see a button marker stating ''Slow'' just be-
fore you went under the first bridge on your right hand side t 
A. I don't remember that. I have been out that way so 
much I don't remember that. 
Q. Where was the Miles' car when you first saw the street 
carY 
A. It was about half a block or a block away from the 
street car. 
Q. Were you under the bridges f 
A. Not quite to the first bridge. 
Q. Not quite to the first bridge when you first saw the 
street carY 
A. That is right. 
Q. Is there an electric light in that intersection Y 
A. Yes, sir, there is one. 
Q. Was it or not burning¥ 
A. It was burning but I didn't notice it. 
Q. What were you doing just before ·the accident, talking 
to Mr. Miles or Miss Miles Y 
A. I was talking to Miss Miles. 
Q. You were not paying any particular attention to what 
was in front. of you. You didn't expect an accident to hap-
pen, did you? 
A. I was looking ahead. I remember that. 
page 26 ~ Q. Was the street car standing still when you 
saw it at first f · 
A. My impression is it was either standing still or moving 
very slowly. 
Q. Was the light on the street car- burning? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The headlight was burning. ~r ere the inside lights burn-
ing? -
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you take your gaze away from the street car after 
you first saw it 7 Did you look away from it or did you con-
tinue to look at the street carY 
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A. I wouldn't know really, but I know that I did see the 
street car. I imagine I kept on looking at it. I kept looking 
forward. . 
Q. Where was the ~files' car when you first saw the motor-
cycle? 
A. Practically on the motorcycle. 
Q. What do you mean by ''practically on it''? Was it about 
five feet away from it Y 
A. I imagine it was a little bit furthe·r than that. 
Q. About ho'v far would you say? Was it ten feetf 
(pause) What I desire to find out is this: You say "prac-
tically on it". Do you mean you were 'vi thin a few feet of 
striking it? 
A. A few feet or a few yards. It was very near it any-
way. 
page 27 } Q. It was very near it. Did anyone yell in the 
car or did you say anything to Mr. Miles or did 
Miss Miles say anything to him? 
A. I don't think so. I know I didn't. 
Q. Did it appear to you to be plenty of room to go between 
the motorcycle and the street ca.r? 
A .. I thought so at the time. I realized that was the only 
thing that could oo done. 
Q. You did think there was space enough to go between 
both of them? 
A. I wouldn't say for sure but that seemed to be the 
only thing. 
Q. W11en you saw the motorcycle just describe what you 
did see. Was there a side car attached to the motorcycle 
or just a. plain motorcycle or what Y 
A. Well, it was a motorcycle with a side car but my im-
pression for just that second was that there were two motor-
cycles. At the time I didu 't know there was a side car but 
I knew there was more than one motorcycle. 
Q. You had the impression there was more than one motor-
cvcle? 
.. A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How many people were on the motorcycle 7 
A. I know there was one on the motorcycle. 
Q. ·you don't lmow whether there was more than one or 
not? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Isn't it a fact that when you say the light 
page 28 } was not burning that you are referring to the 
light of one of the motorcycles Y Did you see the 
rear of both of the motorcycles? 
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A. I didn't see any rear lights burning at all on the motor-
cycles. 
Q. You didn't see any lights burning at all on the motor-
cycles? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Miss Armstrong, isn't it a fact that after the accident 
happened, and I think probably you had gone to the J\IIe-
morial Hospital with 1'Iiss J\lliles, that Mr. Jones of the Lynch-
burg Traction and Light Company came to see you about 
the accident? Do you recall that? 
A. Someone did come. 
Q. Do you recall telling him that you did not know how 
the accident ha ppeued ¥ 
A. I recall telling him that I didn't want to talk about 
it then because I was too worried and I told him which way 
've were headed and where to find Mr. Miles because he could 
tell him more about it and it was more his place to talk, and 
I didn't tell him much of anything. 
Q. I am asking you if you did tell him that you did not 
Icnow how it happened. 
A. I was so upset at the time I told him I didn't want 
• to talk about it and I would rather he would go to Mr. Miles 
and get it from him; that I knew it wasn't my place and 1 
wanted to be with Miss Miles. 
page 29 r Q. Did you or not say to Mr. Jones that you 
did not know how the accident happened Y 
A. I don't remember. I know I didn't answer him many· 
questions. 
Q. You don't know whether you told him you didn't know 
how it happened or not Y 
A. I don't imagine I did. 
Q. Suppose he says you did. Would he be correct? 
A. I wouldn't say for sure because I was upset, but I 
know tha.t I didn't talk to him hardly at all because I went 
back into· the room with Miss Miles. 
Q. You were not hurt in the accident, were you Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Were you a nnrse at that time? 
A. No, sir. I just went in the first of February at the 
Virginia Baptist Hospital. 
Q. Where were you working at the time of the accident t 
A. I just had· a job at Leggett's just before Christmas. 
Q. Was Miss Miles working at Leggett's too Y 
A. No, sir, she was working for Phillips' Brothers, jewelers. 
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RE-DIRE·CT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. Miss Armstrong, Mr. Frost asked you a moment ago 
nbout this visit made by Mr. Jones representing the Lynch-
burg Traction aud Light Company. I understood you to say 
you were at the Memorial Hospital with Miss 
page 30 } Miles. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was that just a short time after the accident? 
A. I don't know just what time it was now. 
Q. You declined to talk with him and tell him anything 
about it? 
A. I told him I was too upset to talk to him; that I would 
rather he would go to Mr. Miles. 
Q. What you are telling us now-
By Mr. Frost (interposing): Don't lead your witness. 
Mr. J orda:n (continues) : Wait until I finish the question. 
Q. What you are telling us now about the accident, is that 
or is that not the facts about the accident as you recall it 
.after calming yourself down? Is that true or not 7 
A. I don't understand what yon mean. 
By the Court: 
Q. Are you telling now how the accident happened~ 
A. I am telling now or was I telling then Y 
Q. Are you giving a true account of how the accident hap-
pened? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Jordon (continues): 
Q. You stated that in talking to Mr. Jones you were all 
upset. Are you still upset about it or not, or are you able 
now to tell the jury just how it happened t 
page 31 } A. As soon as Miss Miles got better I got over 
that. It was the shock at first, that was all. 
Q. Do you or not at this time have a clear recollection of 
how the accident happened Y 
A. I have a clear recollection so far as I have said this 
morning of how it happened. 
The witness stands aside. 
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THOMAS MILES, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. Your name is Thomas Miles, I believe. 
A. Yes, sir. -
Q. I know you have a cold but talk as loud as you can so 
these gentlemen can hear you. Are you the young man who 
was driving the automobile on Christmas Eve night when 
Miss Janie Miles was hurt out on 17th and Campbell Ave-
nue? 
A. Yes, sir. , 
Q. I wish you would please tell the judge and the jury 
in your own way just how the accident occurred. You might 
tell us 'vhen you all got into the car and which way you went 
and so forth leading right up to the accident. 
A. We got in the car over here on Federal Street about 
ten minutes after ten and 'vent out to the car line 
page 32 ~ and turned right two blocks and went down Polk 
Street out to 12th and up 12th to Campbell Ave-
nue and went down the hill to the bottom where them rail-
roads are. When we was going down the hill I saw the street 
car setting over in the bottom and I Imew ther:e was plenty 
of room to pass. I had been going over the street and knew 
it, and I was going on and just as I got to it, right in front 
of it, I seen the motorcycle there so close that I could not 
stop until-without hitting that, and I aimed to go around 
it to keep from hitting him and hit the street car. 
Q. You said you aimed to go around what Y 
A. I aimed to keep from hitting the motorcycle. I aimed 
to pull around him and there wasn't room to go between 
and the front end of my car hit the street car and the hind 
end hit the motorcycle. 
Q. You say you knew that road through there Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had you ever been over it before? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Give us some idea of how well you knew that street 
through there? · 
A. Well, I went over it about every two weeks last sum-
mer. 
Q. Where do you live Y 
A. Down below Gladys. 
Q. In Campbell County? 
A. Yes, sir. 
- : 
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Q. How did you happen to be here on Christmas Eve 
night? _ . 
page 33 ~ A. This girl's father asked me if I would come 
up here and bring her home. 
Q. l\Hss Janie Miles' father? 
A. Yes, sir~ 
Q. Is he kin to you or not Y 
A. Yes, sir, he is my uncle. 
Q. He sent you up here to bring Miss Janie home for her 
Christmas 7 · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you come that day, Christmas Eve day? 
A.. Yes, sir. I got here about five o'clock. 
Q. How long have you been driving an automobile 7 
A. About five. years. 
Q. On this particular occasion how fast were you driving 
just before the accident? 
A. Twenty-five. About twenty-five. 
Q. Twenty-five miles an hour? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Are you or are you not sure you weren't going faster 
than thatY 
A. I know I wasri 't going over that. 
Q. From the time you left Mrs. Armstrong's house on Fed-
eral Street in the eight hundred block out to the time of the 
accident had you or had you not driven carefully or had you 
driven recklessly and at a great rate of speedY 
A. I. drove carefully, and slow. 
Q. Do you happen to know whether or not Campbell Ave-
nue along which you were going is a public street 
page 34 ~ of the City of Lynchburg and is also marked with 
the. State High,vay markers? Do you happen to 
know whether it is a public street of Lynchburg and whether 
there are highway markers on it? 
A. I kno'v it is a public street of Lynchburg. 
Q. Have you ever seen any State Highway markers on it! 
A. What sort of markers 7 
Q. State I-Iighway signs. 
A. About not driving fast and all? 
Q. No. I mean any numbers marking it as one of the 
State Highway thoroughfares. You can say whether or not 
you have noticed them. · 
..A. I don't know whether I have or not. 
Q. Mr. Miles, have you ever been out to the point of the 
accident since this accident occurred 7 · · 
A. Yes, sir. 
. Q. Did you measure or see someone else measure the dis-
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tance from the street car rail on your right-hand side going 
out, the closest one to the curb~ Do you know the distance 
from that rail over to the curbing? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is it Y 
A. Elev·en and a half feet. 
Q. Now, Mr. 1\tiiles, I will ask you to look at this blue print . 
made by DeMott and Magruder, civil engineers, showing 
. the street at the P.Oint of the accident. This ap-
page 35 ~ pears to be Campbell Avenue going from Lynch-
burg in the direction of Fairvie'v lieights. Thh:t 
over here going in at an oblique angle is 17th ~treet. The 
street car tracks go down 17th 8treet, then turn into Cam_p-
bell .A. venue and out towards Fairview Heights. Now, ex-
plain to the court and the jury where the street car was and 
-where the motorcycle was when you first saw the motor-
~ycle. 
A. Right here (indicating on plat). 
Q. Talk so the court and jury can hear you. 
A. It was sitting right up here just 'vhere it makes the 
turn, just ready to turn. 
Q. Now, at that point could you tell us the distance from 
the nearest rail over to the curb where you were trying to 
pass? 
A. The distance from the car rail to the curbingi 
Q. Y.es. 
A. It was eleven feet and a half. 
Q. You saw that measured yourself f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. It shows on the map that it is eleven feet but you saw 
it measured as eleven and a half feet? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Go ahead and explain to the jury in the light of that map 
just how that accident occurred. 
A. When I seen the motorcycle it was setting up on Camp-
bell Avenue just above the street car. 
page 36 r By Mr. Frost : 
Q. Above the street car f 
A. About the end of the car and I came down Campbell 
A venue here and I seen the street car setting here but the 
way the motorcycle was I couldn't see that until I was right 
ooa . 
Air. Jordan (continues)·: 
Q. 1."V as the street car facing yon or not 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Was the headlight of the street car burning or not? 
.A.. Yes, sir, it was burning. · 
Q. Did the motorcycle and the side car have a tail light. 
on it or nott 
.A.. No, sir. 
Q. Now, are you sure about that 7 
.A.. Yes, sir, I am sure of it. 
Q. If it had a red light on it was there anything to inter-
fere with your vision so you couldn't see the red light Y 
.A.. No, sir. If there had been a red light on it I could have 
seen it way up the street and seen it in time to stop. 
Q. Were the brakes on your car in good condition 7 
.A.. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Tell us please, Mr. Miles, whether when you first came 
upon the motorcycle and saw it and the street ca.r, whether 
your passage down Campbell A venue was blocked and ob-
structed or not. 
A. Sirt 
page 37 r Q. Tell us, when you first saw the motorcycle 
whether your right of way was blocked or not by 
the street car and the motorcycle . 
.A.. Yes, sir. When I seen the motorcycle it was setting 
there. 
Q. Coulf) you hav.e gotten through between the motorcycle 
and the street car or not 7 
A. No, sir. 
Q. This map shows Campbell Avenue coming from the 
direction of Fairview Heights in a practically straight line 
until it gets to about the center or the point of the inter-
section of 17th. I wish you would tell the court and the jury 
whether it is leval along there or not and explain to them the 
whole situation. You might start from over at the other end, 
the direction you were going . 
.A.. I came down th.e hill. There is a little raise down there 
and as I come down my lights were down like this (indicating) 
on this place. 
Q. What? 
A. As I came down the hill the street raises a little bit 
in the bottom and my lights were shining down so that they 
wouldn't shine right on the motorcycle where it was setting 
and when I got to that little raise and throwed my lights up 
level with him I was 1ight at him before I could see him. 
Q. In other words, as I understand it, as you came down 
Campbell Avenue you were coming down consider-
page 38 } able grade until you got to about the bridgeT 
A. It is down grade a little below that. 
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Q .. Now explain that again. I didn't quite understand what 
you meant about where your headlights were. 
A. I was coming down that street hill there. That made 
my lights at the bottom right down on the ground so they 
wouldn't ~shine out on a level. They were shining right on 
the ground and they didn't shine on the motorcycle until I 
was right up at it. 
- Q. Was the motorcycle right down in the bottom of the 
dip or notf 
A. Sir! 
Q. Was the motorcycle at the foot of the slope you were 
going down or further over! 
A. It was setting out on the level a little way past the 
foot of the hill. 
Q. When you \Vere coming down the hill then did your 
lights hit the motorcycle or not¥ 
By the Court: He said at least three times, 1\{r. Jordan, 
that he came down the hill and the lights were shining straight 
down and he couldn't see the motorcycle until he struck the 
dip and was right on it. 
By Mr. Jordan : I hope the jury understands it as well 
as your Honor. 
page 39 ~ CROSS. EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Frost": 
Q. Where do you live, Thomas Y 
A. I live down below Gladys. 
Q. At Seneca! 
A. Seneca, Virginia. 
Q. How far from Lynchburg? 
A. It is around thirty miles. 
Q. You live with your uncle, Mr. Miles the father of Miss 
Janie Miles Y 
A. I live there on the place just a little ways from his 
house. -
Q. Yon do not live in his house Y 
A. Not now. 
Q. Does l\tiiss Janie Miles drive an automobile f 
. A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Does she drive this automobile! 
---A. She- drove it when she was at home before she· came to 
t9wn. 
Q. When did she come to townY 
A. J ~nuary before last, I think. 
Q. Jan nary before last Y 
/ 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Has she ever driven the car in between that time at all 1 
When she is at home she drives the car, does she not? 
By Mr. Jordon (interposing): I object to that question 
ns being irrelevant. 
By the Court: I don't think so in view of the 
page 40 ~ pleadings. The pleadings undertake to put in issue 
whether this lady took proper care of herself and 
paid proper heed to the driving· of the car and on that point 
it might tend to sho'v whether or not she did take· proper 
eare if she knew something about the operation of the car. 
1\l[r. F1rost (continues) : 
Q. How long has 1\!Iiss :Miles been drivh1g an automobile 1 
A. I don't know exactly how long. 
Q. A couple of years Y 
A. 1\{ore than two years but I don't kno'v how long. 
Q. You do know she drives an automobile and you have 
seen her drive this particular automobile. Is that correct f 
A. Yes, sir, I have seen her driving it. 
Q. Doos she go and g·et the automobile any time she wants 
it or does she have to ask permission for the automobile Y 
Do you happen to know that Y 
A. She has to ask for it. 
Q. Ask ·who? 
A. Her father. . 
Q. She has to ask her father for the automobile when she 
ru;;es it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Does her father drive it at all? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. He drives? 
page 41 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In other words, as I understand the situation, 
wl1en she wants to go riding she doesn't just get in the auto-
nlobile and drive on or does she ask some body's permission f 
A. She asks somebody. 
Q. Have you ever seen the time she didn't ask to drive 
the automobile1 
A. ~o, sir. . 
Q. You never have seen her drive the automobile without 
asking? · 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What kind of an automobile is it? 
A. It is a '30 model Ford. 
Q. A 1930 model Ford? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. A sedan? 
A. A coach. 
Q. Isn't it a fact that if she told you she wanted to go 
some other place than straight hmne yon would have taken 
her before going straight home that night¥ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. In other 'vords, your orders were to come get her and 
bring· her home. Is that right¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. If she requested you to go some other place you wouldn't 
have taken her? 
page 42 ~ By l\fr. Jordan (interposing): I object to this. 
This isn't the issue that they are trying to raise. 
By the Court: vVhat is the materiality of that? . 
By :Nlr. Frost : I want to see if she had any control over the 
car. 
By the Court: What has that to do with it? 
By Mr. Frost: If she had control she could tell him not to 
go fast or to go fast or to go a different route. That would 
not excuse her from looking out for her own safety but she 
would be more on the lookout in directing his movements,-
By the Court (interposing): I understand this man to· say 
her father asked him to come and get the lady. 
By l\Ir. Frost: I want to find out if the lady had any con-
trol over the car. 
B:y the Court : You asked hirn and he said ''no''. 
1vir. Frost (continues) : 
Q. Did the car have good brakes on it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What kind of brakes, two or fonr-·wheel brakes?· 
A. Four-wheel brakes. 
page 43 ~ Q. Were the lights burning perfectly~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You had your bright lights on at the time of the acci-
dent, did you¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Ifo,v fast ·was your automobile going? 
A. About twenty-five before it hit. 
Q. How fast was it going when it came under the bridge? 
A. Twenty-five. 
Q. You were coming down hill and didn't reduce the speed 
a bit? 
A. I had my brakes on when going under the bdd~~ .. 
Q. They didn't hold Y 
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A. They were. 
Q. You didn't really apply your brakes . 
.A. I had it on some but not enough to stop. 
Q. Not enough to slow down. · 
A. YesJ sir, I slowed down. 
Q. If you were going twenty-five miles an hour going under 
1he bridge and twenty-five miles an hour at the time of the 
accident you didn't slo\v down any, did you? 
.A. I di'dn't sa.y I was going twenty-five \Vhen I hit. I said 
just befor-e I hit. 
Q. You were going twenty-five going under the bridge and 
twenty-five just before you hit. You put on the brakes in the 
meantime but didn't slow your car do\vn. 
A. It slowed down. It didn't hit the street car going 
twenty-five. 
page 44 ~ Q. You don't know how fast you were going. 
You \Vere not looking at the speedometer, were 
you? 
A. I know I \Vasn 't making over twenty-five. 
Q. How do you lmow? You \V.eren 't looking at the 
speedometer. 
A. I wasn't looking at it \Vhen I hit. 
Q. When did you look a.t the speedometer? You never 
did look at tho speedometer on Campbell Avenue, did you 7 
A. I watch it most all the time. · 
Q. I am asking you whether or not you looked at it on 
Campbell Avenue. You didn't look at it then did you? There 
was no reason for you to look at it, \vas it? 
A. Yes, sir. I always look to see how fast it is going in 
town. 
Q. Ans\\rer my question \Vhether you looked at the 
~peedometer on Campbell A venue. If you didn't look at it 
say you didn't look at it. Did you look? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where \Vere you when you looked at the speedometer? 
A. Up there 011 the hill. 
Q. You mean at the top of the hill? 
A. Right after it starts down. 
Q. How fast were you going at that time? 
A. About twenty-five miles an hour. 
Q. Did you see the street ca.r at that time? 
A. I seen the street car when I got over the hill. 
Q. You saw it just as you got over the hill? 
})age 45 } A. I sa\v the street car \Vhen I was coming down 
the hill. 
Q. After you got over the top? 
.A. After I got down to where I could see it. 
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Q. I think the visibility there is about seven hundred feet. 
You could see for a distance of seven hundred feet, couldn't 
you Y In other words, looking towards Fairview Heights you 
saw the street car down in the bottom the first opportunity 
you had to see that intersection. The :first time the inter-
section came in view you saw the street car in sight. Is that 
correctY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. '-As I understand you you say the motorcycle was on 
your side of the street closer to you than the street car. Is 
that right Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The headlight of the street car \Vas burning, wasn't itt 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Isn't it a fact that \Vas shining on the motorcycle1 
A. No, it wasn't shining on it. 
Q. Why wasn't it? 
A. It was over on the 1ig·ht-hand side. 
Q. Was the motorcycle closer to you than the street car was 7 
A. It was a little bit. 
Q. It \Vas a little bit closer. How much closer, 
page 46 ~ do you know? 
.A .. The front end of the motorcycle was up 
about even with the street car. 
Q. You mean to tell the court here and the jury that the 
lights from the headlights on the street car didn't reflect on 
that motorcycle; that the motorcycle 'vas not in the ray of · 
that street car light? 
A. It was sitting over to the right-hand side of it. 
Q. I ask you if it wasn't in the ray of the street car light, 
the headlight of the street car. You say the motorcycle was 
closer to you than the street car was. I am asking if the 
headlight of the street car didn't shine on the motorcycle 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. How do you explain that~ 
A. Because the street car light shines ahead. 
Q. It shines out to the side too, doesn't it? 
A. It don't shine straight out to the side where the motor-
cycle was that close to it. 
Q. The motorcycle is some length and there has been tes1 i.-
many that there was another motorcycle on that motorcycle. 
A. That don't make it any longer. 
Q. But you have the full length of the motorcycle, haven't 
you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Does_n 't that ray of light diverge across the street? You 
sa\v the hght of the street car on the ground Y 
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page 47 ~ A. Yes, sir. Q. Did yon see the car tracks in front of the 
street carY 
A. I don't know whether I saw the tracks or not. I saw· 
the car. 
Q. vVasn't the lights in the street car burning? 
A. It ·was lit up in there. I don't know whether all of 
them were burning. 
Q. Isn't it a fact there is an arc light right in that inter-
section? Did yon ever see that? 
A. A what? 
Q. An arc light, a street lig·ht. 
A. It is up above there. 
Q. How far above 7 
A. I don't know exactly how far it is. 
Q. Ten feet? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Tha.t was lighted at the time, wasn't it 1 
ll. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Do yon mean to tell this jury that you couldn't see the 
motorcycle with all that light in that intersection? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As an actual fact you were looking at the street car, 
weren't you? You didn't h.11ow whether it was going around 
the curve or not, did you 1 
A. I knew it 'vas stopped. 
Q. You didn't know when it was going to start, 
page 48 ~ did you? 
A. I didn't know when it was going to start. 
Q. ·Your mind was directed to the street car, wasn't it?· 
A. I could see the street car there and knew there was 
plenty of room to go through there without there being any-
tiling there in the way. 
Q. You say you are familiar with the intersection there. 
Don't you know that the street car when it goes around ·a 
curve overhangs in the street? 
A. I know that too but there is plenty of room to go through 
there. 
Q. Even with it overhanging? 
A. Yes, sir. Q. IIave you ever been through there? 
A. I haven't been through but I have stood there and looked 
at it. 
Q. You knew that was a dangerous place there? 
A. I knew it was plenty of room to go through. 
Q. You did know that was a dangerous place in the street, 
didn't you Y · 
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A. There wouldn't have been any danger if there hadn't 
been something in the 'vay. 
Q. You consid~r that was a saf-e place even though you 
know the street car overhangs there? 
A. I know it overhangs but it doesn't overhang ~nough to 
keep you from going through there. 
Q. You have tested it yourself 'f 
A. I have looked at a car going through there. 
page 49 ~ Q. Didn't you see a button marker on the 12th 
Street side of Campbell A venue, a n1arker saying 
"Slow"? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Why didn't you reduce your speed then 1 
A. I did. 
Q. I am trying to get the truth of it. You were going 
twenty-five miles an hour under the first bridge and twenty-
five miles ·an hour just before the accident happened. When 
did you reduce your speed 1 
A. Wasn't that just before it? 
Q. What do you mean when you say "Wasn't that just 
before it"? 
A. When I ·wei1t under the bridge. 
Q. You stated you were going twenty-five miles an hour be-
fore you went under the bridge. Is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You sa'v the button marker ''Slow"? 
A. Yes, sir. That was just before it. 
Q. How far were yon away when you reduced your speed 
from twenty-five miles an hour to something else? 
A. About the time I started under the bridge I put my foot 
on the brake and I just attempted to slow down to go around 
there. 
Q. How fast were you going when the actual accident took 
place? 
A. I don't know exactly what I was making. 
Q. Were you going twenty-five miles an hourf 
page 50~ A. No. 
Q. How fast were you goingf 
A. I can't say exactly what it was making when it hit. 
Q. Ho,v long does it take you to stop going at twenty-five 
miles an hour? 
A. It don't take but just a little bit. 
Q. How much-ten feet? 
A. I don't know whether it would stop in ten feet or not. 
Q. How much would it take 1 Can you give us some idea f 
A. It would take more than ten feet. 
Q. How much more than ten feet f 
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.A. I don't know exactly what it would take. 
Q. Twelve f-eet 1 
A. It would take around twenty feet, I think. It will stop 
in forty feet at forty miles an hour. 
Q. Four-wheel brakes going twenty-five miles an hour you 
can stop your car in twenty feet i 
A. I said I didn't lmow exactly how many it would take 
but you couldn't stop it in t.en feet I know. 
Q. Could, you stop it in twenty feet? 
A. I reckon it 'vould stop in twenty feet. I lmow it would. 
Q. When you got to the bottom of the hill you saw the 
motorcycle, didn't you t 
A. I saw the motorcycle when I was right on it. 
page 51 } I hadn't time to cut around it. 
Q. How far were you from the motorcycle when 
you sa'v it? 
A. I don't ln1ow exactly, but just a few feet. 
Q. Three feet? 
A. A few feet. 
Q. How many feet? 
A. I don't kno,v. 
Q. Can you give us any idea? Was it less than five feet 
or more than five f.eet? 
A. It 'vasn 't over that. 
Q. It wasn't over five feet when you first saw the motor-
cycle? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. As I understand it you said coming down the hill your 
lights hit the level part of the street before it got to the 
motorcycle and therefore your lights were not shining on the 
motorcycle. 
A. As I came down the hill the lights were bound to be 
~hining down. 
Q. Bound to be shining down? 
A. Yes, sir, until I got to the bottom. 
Q. Then the lights were shining out straight t 
A. Yes, sir, after I got down there. 
Q. The lights of your automobile would shine on the motor-
cycle when you got to the bottom of the hill and started 
going on a level. Is that correct? 
A. vVhat? 
page 52 } Q. Your lights would shine on the motorcycle 
when your car got to the bottom of the hill and got 
Qn the level portion of the ·street? 
A. Yes, sir, it would shine out when I got down there. 
Q. In other words, you could have seen the motorcycle if 
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you had been loolcing when you got to the bottom of the 
hill. Is that correct? 
A. No. I was looking. 
Q. Why didn't you see the motorcycle f It was right in 
front of you. 
A. Because it didn't hav·e no rear light on it. 
Q. You had plenty of other light and your headlights were 
burning. 
Q. They were burning but they did not shine on it in time 
for me to see it. 
Q. Will you explain to us wl1y the headlights would not 
shine on the motorcycle 7 
A. I have told you about four times. 
Q. I will ask you if this is not a picture looking down into 
the intersection in the direction you 'vere going. 
A. I was coming down this street. 
Q. Coming on the right-hand side of the street f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you please explain to the court and jury why your 
headlights-you say they were working perfectly-would not 
shine on everything in that int·ersection Y Can you explain 
thatY 
page 53 ~ By the Court. Hasn't he undertaken to do that 
not less than six times Y You don't have to accept 
his version. He has told you his version so what do you 
gain, gentlemen, by taking up t4e tim·e by going over and 
over the same pointY 
By 1\{r. Frost: I am trying to get him to explain why he 
says the light would not shine on the motorcycle. 
By the Court: He has undertaken his explanation at least 
six times by actual count. Now if you want to argue against 
that you may do that. If you want to put on a witness to 
testify against that you can, but there ought to be a limit to 
bow many times you can ask him the same question. 
Mr. Frost (continues): 
Q. When you got home that night did you tell your uncle 
about this accident f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You told him all about it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How old are you? 
A. Nineteen. · 
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RE-DIRECT EXAl\IINATION. 
By l\Ir. Jordan: 
Q. I will ask you again to look at this map that has been 
introduced. Coming down Campooll Avenue in the direction 
you were traveling there seems to be a slight bend or elbow 
in Campbell Avenue changing its direction slightly. 
page 54 ~ As you came down Campbell A venue with your 
lights ahead of you would or would not your lights 
be thrown on the point where the motorcycle wasT 
A. No. The motorcycle was setting here and the lights 
would not shine on it. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By 1\fr. Frost: . 
Q. Yon say when you reached this point here that your 
headlights 'vould not shine on the· motorcycle T 
A. The motorcycle was setting over here to the side. 
Q. Where your finger is? 
A. It was here on this bend. 
Q. Just draw on the map 'vhere the motorcycle was at the 
time of the accident. · 
A. It was right over here on the right-hand side. It was a 
few feet from the street car but this here bend is farther 
down than this. 
Q. In other words, this plat is not correct Y 
A. Where is the railroad. 
Q. It doesn't show the railroad bridges there. The level 
part of the street begins· down here where this pole is, isn't 
tl1at correct¥ 
A. It don't begin there. It begins about the bend. The 
pictures show the bend. 
Q. You placed the n10torcycle about two feet on the 12th 
Street side of where you placed the street car. Is that cor-
rect? 
A. Two feet down. 
page 55 ~ Q. On the 12th Stroot side? 
A. From where¥ 
Q. From the street car. 
A. I don't }rnow exactly how many feet it was. 
Q. That is what I asked you, to place the motorcycle and 
you said two feet. 
A. I said, or meant to say a few feet. 
The witness stands aside. 
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JANIE F. ~IlLES, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXA~IINATION. 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. 1\tiiss Miles, you are Miss Janie· F. lVliles, the plaintiff 
in this case? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I wish you would please tell the court and jury in your 
own 'vay how this accident occurred. First tell us this : Your 
family live down in Campbell County, is that true¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were here in Lynchburg living here and working? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And on Christmas Eve night you intended to go home 
to spend Christmas at home. Is that true? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now tell us how you were going home and what hap-
pened up to and including the accident. 
A. We started home that night. In fact we had 
page 56 ~ to 'vork until nine o'clock and in the meantime 
Daddy sent Thomas for us because we had no 
mea.ns of getting home. I imagine it 'was around ten or 
ten-ten when 've left Mrs. Armstrong's home on Federal 
Street going· home and went, as Miss Armstrong· and Mr.· 
Thomas Miles have stated, down Campbell Avenue and we 
did not see the motorcycle until we 'vas right on it due to 
the fact that they didn't have any rear lights on them, but we 
did see the street car. I couldn't say just ho·w far. We 
were going down the hill 'vhen we saw the street car and 
it was lit up and the front light was burning. 
Q. Was the front light of the street car shining in your 
direction, or not? 
A. Well, it was shining in front of the street car naturally. 
Q. Was the front light of the street car shining in you all's 
eyes or not? 
A. No, it was straight ahead. 
Q. Were you going toward the street car or not? 
A. We )VCre going straight toward the street car. 
Q. How close were you would you say to the motorcycle 
and side car before you sa'v the motorcycle and side carY 
A. I couldn't say definitely because we were right on it 
before we even saw it. 
Q. Did you have time enough from the time you saw it 
to apply the brakes and stop the carY 
A. No we did not. 
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Q. Were the brakes on the car in good condition or not 7 
A. Absolutely. 
page 57} Q. Absolutely what? 
A. In good conditiqn-perfect. 
Q. From the time that you started driving from Mrs. Arm-
strong's house out to the point of the accident with Thomas 
as the driver, did he or did he not drive in a careless or 
careful manner? 
A. l-Ie drove in a very careful manner. He usually does. 
Q. Had you ever driven with him previously? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was there anything whatever about his driving from 
the time that you left the Armstrong house to the scene of 
the accident that would lead you to believe that there was 
danger in the manner in which he 'vas driving? 
A. No there wa.s not. 
Q. Was your passage past the street car when it was stand-
ing still blocked or not by the motorcycle and side-car? 
A. It was blocked. 
Q. Do you happen to know whether Campbell Avenue going 
out tha.t way is marked with a State Highwa.y sign 7 
A. I never have noticed them. I guess· it is. 
Q. Is that one of the thoroughfares to Rustburg, the county 
seat of Campbell Oountyf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, ]\ifiss ~files, tell the court and jury about your 
injuries. Lift up your hat and show them the scar 
pag·e 58} you received. 
A. I have this one here and the one in the edge 
of the hair. You may be able to see it from where you are. 
It is very red. 
Q. How many stitches were taken? 
A. Twelve in all, I think. 
Q. You were taken to the hospital 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long did you remain? 
A. I went the night of the accident about eleven o'clock 
and came back the next afternoon about six o'clock. 
Q. Christmas da.y? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long were you under treatment of the doctor for 
1his injury? 
A. I don't know exactly how long. It was two or three 
weeks. I know it was a good many times I went to see Dr. 
Rawlins. 
Q. Did you have your head bandaged up during that time Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Were you able to do any of your work during that time Y 
A. No, I stayed off from work about three weeks, I imagine. 
Q. How fast was the automobile going immediately before 
and at the time of the accident' 
A. I wouldn't say a definite rate of speed. It 
page 59 r 'vas between twenty and twenty-five. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Frost: 
Q; Was there any reduction in the speed from the time you 
went under the bridge to the time of the impact Y 
A. There was. 
Q. How much. How fast do you think you were going at 
the time of the impact T 
A. I couldn't say definitely because I don't lmow. 
The witness stands aside. 
By Mr. Jordan:. We rest. 
By Mr. Barksdale: I want to address a motion to the 
court. 
By the Court: I tl1ink I anticipate what your motion is. 
I strike out.-the evidence as against the street car company. 
There. is no evidence here on which the jury could properly 
find a verdict against the street raihvay company. There 
is no evidence of anything as affects the street railway com-
pany except for some reason the street railway car conductor 
stopped his car and while it was stopped this automobile 
ran into it. Ordinarily I am v·ery loath to strike out the evi-
dence until all of the evidence on both sides· is in, but this 
does not appear to me to be a case in which there 
page 60 ~ was any sort of likelihood that the testimony for 
the defendant 'vould tend to show any sort of 
reason imputing negligence to the railway company for the 
stopping .of the car at that point, and the plaintiff having 
had full opportunity to bring out his case the court would 
have to set aside any verdict that the jury might :find against 
the raihvay company and for that reason, under the rule laid 
down by the Court of Appeals the court strikes out the evi-
dence as against the railway company. 
By Mr. Jordan: We note an exception, your honor, al-
though we think you are right. 
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EVIDENCE FOR TI-lE DEFENSE. 
S. J. BREMER, 
· having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. . 
By Mr. Frost: 
Q. Mr. Bremer, what do you do for a livingY 
A. Photographic work. 
Q. I will ask you whether you took this picture 1. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know what date you. took it? 
A. The 6th of this month, March 6th, 1935. 
Q. Did you take this other picture? 
A. I did, yes, sir. 
Q. What date did you take that picture Y 
page 61 ~ A. I took that on the· 14th of March. 
Q. I will ask you to file those two pictures as 
Bremer Exhibits Nos. "A" and "·B ". 
Note: The same are herewith filed marked ''Bremer Ex-
hibit A" and "Bremer Exhibit B". 
The 'vitness stands aside. 
Note: Then and there court was adjourned at 1 :00 o'clock 
P. 1'1., March 19th, 1935 until 2:30 o'clock P. M., of same 
day. 
Note : Court met pursuant to adjournment at 2 :30 P. M. 
R. S. REYNOLDS, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Ry Mr. Frost: 
Q. You are Mr. R. S. Reynolds, are you? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. By whom are you employed? 
A. The City of Lynchburg. 
Q. In what capacity! 
A. I am a police officer. 
Q. Were you a police officer on the 24th day of December, 
1934? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. This is a suit arising out of an accident that occurred 
or or near the intersection of 17th and Campbell A venue 
in Lynchburg. Were you called to that accident? 
page 62 ~ A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. When you arrived at the scene of the acci-
dent was the street car there? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. vV as the motorcycle there¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the automobile? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you take any notes as to different measurements? 
Did you n1ake any measurements~ 
A. No, sir, I did not. 
Q. Did you take any notes of the accident t 
A. I did at that time. 
Q. Have you them \vith yon 1 
A. No, sir, I done away with them. I had them down on a 
paper in a book. 
Q. Have you them with you now? 
By the Court: 
Q. He said he has destroyed them. Did you not? 
A. As soon as I got through \vith them in police court I 
destroyed them. 
By Mr. Frost (Continuing): 
Q. Will you tell what you saw when you went to the scene 
of the accident 1 Where was the street car? 
A. The street car was coming from Fairview IIeights to 
town and the automobile 'vas headed out of town 
page 63 ~ on Campbell Avenue and the motorcycle \Vas also 
headed out of town, parked close to the right curb 
going out of town, and of course it had all happened when I 
got there, but the automobile just run headlong into the street 
car and side-swiped the motorcycle. 
Q. Were the street car and the automobile engaged, the 
front portion of the automobile engaged with any portion of 
the street carY 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Just describe how they were hooked together. 
A. Well, the left front end of the automobile hit the left 
front end of the street car and they were tied up there. The 
street car, if I ain't mistaken, the operator had to back the 
street car up to get them aloose, or either \Ve pulled the 
automobile from the car. I disremember \Vhich we did. You 
see it has been so long ago. 
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Q. Did you make any investigation as to whether there were 
any skid marks in the street behind the path of the auto-
mobile? 
A. I looked for them .. 
Q. Did you see any 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you examine the brakes of the automobile Y 
A. No, sir, I didn't. You couldn't tell anything much about 
them after that accident. 
Q. Was the automobile badly broken up 1 
A. Broken up right bad. 
Q. Mr. Reynolds, I will ask you if there is sufficient light 
at that int-ersection for a person to have seen the 
page 64} motorcycle a distance of two hundred feet away. 
A. Yes, sir. There is good light there in the 
bottom. 
CROSS EXAMINATION~ 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. Would you say that there was sufficient light in the 
bottom to have seen the motorcycle if the headlight of the 
street car was shining in your face? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The headlight of the street car 'vould not interfere with 
your vision so you wouldn't see the motorcycle f 
A. No, sir, not me. 
Q. The automobile was not broken beyond repair, was it? 
A. I really don't know, J\IIr. Jordan, because I don't know 
whether it "\vas repaired or not. 
Q. You said it was dght badly broken? 
A. Not so it couldn't be fixed. 
Q. That is a part of the State Highway system there, is 
it not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Part of route 460 ~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In going from 12th Street you go down a hill under 
the bridge, don't you f 
A. The Norfolk and Western bridge. 
Q. And you come to a sort of little dip in there and come 
up to where the car tracks are, don't you 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. It isn't all level along in there. In going 
page 65 ~ under the tracks the road dips down a little lower 
than it is on each side. Isn't that true 7 
A. There is a side line from the main line that runs up to 
the box factory, and where that siding crosses it is higher 
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than at either end of the bottom. There is a little rise in 
there. 
Q. Where was the street car and the motorcycle with refer-
ence to that dipY Were they at the very bottom of the dip 
or a little beyond Y 
A. Right in the dip, right at the bottom. It was just about 
in the bottom of Campbell Avenue. 
Q. Isn't it true that the lowest point of Campbell A venue 
going down there is immediately under the overhead bridget 
A. Well, I don't know exactly, Mr. Jordan, because I didn't 
pay any particular attention to that. I never had. any oc-
casion to. 
Q. It wasn't immediately under the railroad· bridge that 
the accident occurred, was it~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. A little distance beyond 1 
A. ·Yes, sir, on the east side. 
Q. Where was the motorcycle setting when you found it f 
A. Setting close to the right curb going out of town. 
Q. V\T as the autornobile knocked up into it f 
A. No, sir. As well as I can recall it was clear of the 
motorcycle. 
page 66 ~ Q. Did you see any evidence of the automobile 
having hit the motorcycle and knocked it up there Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You told us the left front of the automobile and the 
left front of the street car are what came together? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In other ·words, if the automobile had been a trifle fur-
ther to the right the automobile and the street car would not 
h.a ve come together Y 
A. No, sir, they wouldn't have. 
Q. It was not then a head-on collision. You don't mean 
they came head-on in the middle Y 
A. Not straight in the center. 
The witness stands aside. 
C. L. DEMOTT, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Hy Mr. Frost : 
Q. You are ~fr. C. L. DeMott, are youY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is your profession, Mr. DeMott! 
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A. Civil engineer. 
Q. Did you at my request make a plat of the intersection 
of 17th and Campbell Avenue 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is this the plat f 
A~ Yes, sir, that is the plat. 
page 67 ~ Q. I ask you to file that as ''DeMott Exhibit A''. 
Note: The saine is herewith filed, marked ''DeMott Exhibit 
A". 
By ~Ir. Frost: At this point I want to make a statement 
that the motorman had the actual street car on the scene and 
the operator of the motorcycle had the actual motorcycle 
there and placed them 'vhere the street car and the motor-
cvcle were at the time of the accident. I make that statement 
i{l view of Mr. DeMott having placed these objects on the 
plat. Of course that will be proven by witnesses on the stand 
later. 
Q. Mr. De~Iott, did you go to C'ampbell Avenue in the 
direction of 12th Street, looking back towards the intersec-
t ion, to see ho'v far from the inters-ection you could see it!. 
A. Yes, sir. • 
Q. How far could you see the intersection while you were 
on Campbell Avenue' 
A. We could see, gentlemen, an entire automobile in that 
bottom from a slight distance east of 15th Street. I should 
say fifty feet east of it or at least seven hundred feet from 
the bottom. You could see all of the automobile, that is, under 
the over head bridges. 
Q. Is that on the 12th Street side of the intersection? 
A. That is· on' the 12th Street side of the intersection. 
page 68 ~ By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. Did you go in the daytime· or nighttime Y 
.A. In the daytime. 
By ~Ir. Jordan (addressing the court): I move that that 
he stricken out. The conditions were not the same as when 
the accident occurred. 
By the Court: I think, Mr. Jordan, that may be admitted 
for what it is worth, but of course the jury would take into 
consideration it was daytime a.nd not nighttime. In other 
words, the testimony is to the effect that in the daytime you 
could see seven hundred feet. So far he hasn't stated how 
far you equid see, if at all, at night. 
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By Mr. Jordan: I thought the court ruled that conditions 
must be the same. However, we 'vill just note an exception. 
lfr. Frost (continues): 
Q. Where would you place the foot of the down grade or 
the end of the down grade on Campbell A venue and the be-
ginning of the do,vn grade 1 
A. Well, the foot of the grade is evidently the drain down 
on the far side of Fishing creek from 12th Street. It is 
shown on this drawing. The grade is approximately level 
from the ·curve on the opposite side, on the left-hand side 
coming down from the beginning of the curve. 
By the Court: 
Q. Where, with ref.erence to the street light that you ha.ve 
marked on the map? 
A. From twenty to thirty feet behind the street 
page 69 ~ light over to the drain in there it is almost per-
fectly level, probably a slight bit down grade. 
By ];fr. Frost : 
Q. How far from the 12th Street side from the rear of the 
motorcycle does the down grade stop f 
A. Well, sixty or eight feet from the rear of the motor-
cycle. I am sure it is as much as sixty feet. 
Q. Is this map drawn to scale? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Could you tell us a little more definitely than sixty or 
eighty feet Y 
A. Gentlemen, I didn't measure the grade, but my recol-
lection is that back there for eig·hty feet to the rear of the 
motorcycle it is level. I know it is level for sixty feet, or 
practically so. I don't know that this floor is level, but it is 
practically so. The 'vater would run down to that drain there. 
By the Court : 
Q. Your scale is one inch to ten feet f 
A. That is right, sir. It measures about forty feet from 
the rear of the motorcycle to the ligl1t pole and then just 
back to where the word ''curb" is written on the curb line it 
is eighty feet. I kno'v there is another inlet around that 
curve and around that curve is the stopping place for the 
street car, about the end of the word ''Engineers'' it is level 
from this point opposite the curve to that point. 
page 70 ~ By Mr. Frost: 
Q. What is the length of the street carY 
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A. Forty-one feet. 
Q. What is the width of the street carf 
A. Eight feet four inches. 
Q. What is the distance from the outside of the street 
car, that is, not the rail or wheel, but the side of the street 
car to the curbingY 
A . .About nine and a half feet if the street car is standing 
still. 
Q. What is the length of the motorcycle' 
A. It is about eight feet and a half. 
Q. What is the width of the .motorcycle 7 
A. That motorcycle measures ov.er six feet, that is, from 
the outside of the handlebars and shin-guard to the far wheel 
it measures quite a bit more than six feet 
Q. Were you present when the photographer took the pic-
tures? 
A. Yes, sir, I was present. 
Q. Could you state how far the photographer was when he 
took this picture away from the motorcycle and street ear 7 
A. He was right here at this white spot. Now, the street 
car was on a straight track back there and the photographer 
was near the white spot that is marked on the map. 
Q. While you were present did the operator of the street 
car, Mr. Mayhew, move the car around the curve Y 
page 71 } A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you measure the overhang of the ear Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. vVhat was the overhang? 
A. Two feet and six inches outside of the rail. There is 
another drawing of the street car on this map, gentlemen, 
showing how much of it overhangs the rail and it shows why 
it overhangs. The pivot over the truck is also shown and 
of course the truck centers across those pivots and the street 
car projects two feet and a half over the rails. 
Q. What would be the distance between the street car while 
on the curve with the overhang you speak of to the curb7 
A. About eight feet. It would be eight feet and a half. 
Q. What is the condition of the street where you have 
marked ''drain inlet'' at the lower right-hand side of the 
plat? Is it level or down grade or what? 
A. The jury all know that those drain inlets are placed in 
the lowest part in the street and when the water drains from 
both sides it is right much lo,ver, but when the water drains 
from one side only they generally build up a hump on the 
other side so that if a motor vehicle hits that inlet it is bound 
to get a bump. It will be shaken up to some extent. The 
side that hit the drain is bound to be thrown up. 
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page 72 t Q. How wide is that drain T 
A. A foot and a half. 
Q. Is there a marker on the 12th Street side of the inter-
section! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. A marker for regulating the speed for automobiles? 
A. Well, there is one of these reflector button signs marked 
"Slow" abop.t two hundred and forty feet back of the electric 
light pole on the right-hand side going do,vn. It is just about 
the intersection of that portion of 17th Street that goes over 
to the Cotton Mill, one of these three-cornered signs and the 
word '' S-L-0-W'' is on it and these reflector buttons. 
· Q. Is there an arc light in the intersection? 
A. Yes, sir, just forty feet in the rear of where the motor-
cycle was parked. That is, forty feet in the direction of 12th 
Street from the motorcycle. 
Q. When an automobile arrives a distance, you say, be-
tween sixty and eig·hty feet from where the motorcycle was 
proceeding towards Fairview lieights on Campbell Avenue 
where would the headlights shine? 
A. The brightest part of the automobile headlight, Mr. 
Frost, is straight ahead in· the line of travel and the illumi-' 
nating engineers, as they call themselves, require that the 
lights shall he of such angle as to light both ditches of the 
highway and also down the road immediately in front of the 
. car and then the upper atmosphere high enough 
page 73 ~ to see the limbs to a tree or the middle of a garage 
door if you are driving in. There is light enough 
to distinguish a material object anY'vhere within an angle 
say of sixty degrees on either side and above. · 
Q. As I understand you you place the end of the decline 
of the street or the grade of the street between sixty and 
eighty feet from the motorcycle, approximately. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do I understand that to be approximately where the 
word "curve'' on the map is 1 · 
A. Yes, sir. Mr. ~,rost, I didn't measure the grade, but 
that is my judgment. I know that it is practically level in 
that bottom a.nd I measured th€re for some time and there 
is no material grade there. 
Q. When an automobile arrives at approximately the place 
called ''curve'' on the right-hand side of Campbell Avenue, 
facing Fairview Heights, 'vith its lights burning would the 
lights shine on a motorcycie if it was placed where it was 
placed on this pia t 1 · 
. A. Yes, sir, if the headlight was burning it would. It would 
be bound t_o. . · . -
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Q. Do you know any reason because of the topography of 
the street why it would not shine on it? 
A. No reason under the sun unless some object was parked 
between him and the motorcycle. If there was a solid object 
between he couldn't see it but the light would shine on it 
if nothing was between it. 
Q. Would the fact- that the curve at the lower 
page 74 ~ part of this plat becomes wider after it passes the 
light pole affect the rays of ligb:t? 
A. No, sir. That is just a sidewalk curve. There is a side-
walk on that side and the light shines right over that. The 
pole can't hide the motorcycle. 
Q. Are these positions of the street car and the motor-
cycle the positions as placed on your plat? . 
A. Looking at them it looks little more distance between 
them than if taken straight ahead. 
By One of the Jurors : 
Q. I want to know the per cent of grade coming down to 
, those bridges. 
A. ~Ir. Juryman, I don't think the percentage from the far 
side of the overhead crossing down to under there is as much 
as three per cent. 
Q. It seems right steep. 
A. Under the railroad crossing it is not over three per 
cent and that :Battens out after going under th~ Southern 
bridge. 
Q. That grade above there is greater than that? 
A. About six per cent, certainly not as high as seven per 
cent going up the hill, but from Bibee's store is from 17th 
Street it isn't as much drop from there on. 
Bv 1\fr. Frost: 
· Q. When did you make this plat, Mr. DeMott Y 
A. On the 6th of March. 
Q. Do you know whether the· button marker referred to 
was placed there before December 24, 1934 7 
page 75 ~ A. Except by hearsay it was there. 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. You don't know it yourself 7 
A. No, sir. 
By Mr. Jordan (addressing the Court): I move tha.t that 
be stricken out. 
By the Court: It is stricken out. 
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CROSS EXA~1INATION. 
By ~lr. Jordan: 
Q. You made a remark a moment ago, Mr. DeMott, that 
the photographic evidence showed the distances to be greater 
than what they actually were. 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. vVha.t did you say a moment ago f 
A. I said it appar-ently 'vas greater than it would be if 
the car went straight ahead. It sho,ved a greater distance 
because of the angle. 
Q. In other words, the photographs are misleading, a.ren 't 
theyT 
A. To that extent, yes, sir. I will tell you what I mean, 
l\1:r. J orda.n. If you take the plat and look a.t it, the point 
of vision is near that white mark. N o'v looking at an angle 
between the white mark and the corner of the motorcycle 
and the nearest corner of the street car you will get a right 
wide ang·le and that would seem to indicate that there 'vas -
right much distance between there but it is not enough dis-
tance between them if they both went straight ahead to get 
an automobile in the.re. That is what I meant. 
page 76 ~ Q. You said that the photograph was mislead-
ing. Is that what I understand from itf 
A. Did I mak-e that statement, ~Ir. Stenographer? 
By the Court: You make what statement you want to make 
now, Mr. DeMott. 
1\Ir. Jordan (continues) : 
Q. You said it sho,ved up in the photograph a greater dis-
tance than the actual distance on the ground. 
A. I said it showed up apparently that there was a greater 
distance behveen the motorcycle and the street car than there 
would be if the motorcycle moved ahead. 
Q. In other words, the photograph is not strictly accurate? 
A. It is accurate as far as it pretends to show. From that 
viewpoint it is absolutely accur~te. 
Q. That is true of all photographs 1 
A. Generally speaking, yes, sir, if the light is good. 
Q. Were these photographs taken in the day or night¥ 
A. Daytime. 
Q. You spoke of a drain or something there in the street .. 
There is no reason why the motorcycle couldn ''t have pro-
ceeded across that drain, was there f 
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A. Well, Mr. Jordan, I think that if a motorcycle had 
started across there and the street car was running it would 
have bumped against the car. 
page 77 } Q. "'Why do you think soY 
A. There is such a few feet between them. 
Q. Isn't the drain made so that vehicles can pass across 
It. with safety when street cars are there¥ 
A. I don't lmo'v about that. 
Q. Why not? 
A. Because the drain is built for one purpose. Of course 
they are supposed to be perfectly safe to travel over at any 
time but it depends on the rate of speed you hit them on 
how much you will be bounced. As a matter of fact I don't 
know anybody who drives close enough to the curb to be 
bounced by the street drain. They keep away from them. 
You can do it. 
Q. You can go across there at a slow rate of speed with 
perfect safety? 
A. Yes, sir, even with a street car moving, I think. 
Q. I believe you said that there was a distance of eight 
and a half feet between the extreme overhang of the street 
car when it was rounding the curve and the curb through 
which a motorcycle could have passed, did you not Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Eight and a half feet and the motorcycle is six feet 
1vide? . 
.A. Six feet and four-tenths, which is about six feet five 
inches and eight and a half feet clearance. 
Q. That is at the worst we will say with the street car 
moving, but with the street car not moving there was still more 
c-learance, ·wasn't it 1 
A. \Veil, no. I think it is eight and a half feet with the 
street car moving or standing still. Thirteen and 
page 78} a half feet is half of the street and take off of that 
four feet and two inches that would be nine feet, 
four inches with the street car standing still on the straight 
track. 
Q. On this plat that you have just shown it clearly shows 
that Campbell Avenue from 12th Street going down to 17th 
Street makes a kink right at that point. 
·A. There is a slig·ht bend there. 
Q. And goes slightly to the right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
· Q. An automobile coming down to this point with its head-
lights focused ahead would show up on the street car, would 
it not, and not over on a motorcycle~ 
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A. Not as much as you seem to indicate, Mr. Jordan. It 
would be slightly to the left. 
Q. Wouldn't the center of the light be straight ahead and 
not over on the motorcycle 1 
A. It would be about where the corner of the motorcycle is. 
The corner of the motorcycle is about in line of the travel of 
the automobile. 
Q. I wish you would take your rule and project it to the 
center line of Campbell Avenue coming down the hill to the 
point where the street car is and tell us where it would ex-
tend. 
By Mr. Frost: I object to tbis line of questioning in view 
of the fact that Thomas Miles testified he was on 
page 79 ~ the right-hand side of the street. 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. Put it on the right-hand side. It will show just the 
same. 
A. What do you want to find outf 
Q. We will assume an automobile is traveling down the 
right-hand side of Campbell Avenue. Where would the lights 
be focused¥ Would it be over .on the side car or where the 
street car was 1 
A. It would be nearer the middle over there. It would be 
nearer the center of the street. . 
Q. It would be nearer over there than over here where you 
have indicated the motorcycle was. Did you go out to this 
place at night and have a street car standing there with its 
lights on shining in your direction and look down there and 
see if you could see a motorcycle standing at the point where 
you have indicated here f 
A. No, sir. 
· Q. You don't know whether it could be seen under those 
ri rcumstances or not, do you? 
A. No, except in my judgment, and the jury is as capable 
of judging that as I am. 
Q. You are telling us about automobile headlights. What 
about street car headlights? Isn't the reflector of a street 
car light made so that it throws all of its light ahead f 
A. I don't know.· I have never seen specifications for 
lights of street cars, but I 'vould say that a street car's angle 
of reflection. should be narrower than an automo-
page 80 ~ bile's because that is confined to a track and an 
auton1obile can go anywhere and may have to turn 
more or less quickly whereas the street car has its headlight 
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almost straight ahead. I would say the angle of a street car 
light would be narrower. 
Q. Do you happen to kno'v that right along about this point 
is an entrance to a filling station? 
A. There is one there. 
Q. Where is that filling station 7 
A. Only a few feet of the turn. 
Q. On this side or the other Y 
A. Just beyond Fishing Creek. 
Q. I think that condition was true on the 24th of D·ecem-
ber, wasn't it? 
. A. I don't think there has been any change in the condi-
tions since then. 
Q. Was the filling station there then Y 
A. There has been one there for y-ears. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Frost: 
Q. Mr. Jordan asked you about the rays of the light. When 
the automobile proceeded to a point on Campbell Avenue 
going towards Fairview Heights at the place you call "pole" 
where would its lights then be shining? 
A. It would be illuminating the ·entire street in front of 
it. 
Q. How far is the pole from the motorcycle 1 
A. Forty feet. 
page 81 ~ Q. How far is the pole from the street carY 
A. It is about seventy feet. I have it here 
exactly. The pole is sixty-three feet and a half from the 
street car. 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. The pole is sixty-three and a half feet from the front 
end of the street car? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. It wasn't that far to the motorcycle was itf 
A. It was forty feet to the rear of the motorcycle and 
twenty-three and a half feet between the rear of the motor-
cycle and the front end of the street car. 
The witness stands aside. 
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STANFORD DEANE, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Frost: 
Q. "\Vhat is your name¥ 
A. Stanford Deane. 
Q. Where do you live¥ 
A. 2360 Campbell Avenue. 
Q. This is a case arising· out of an accident that occurred 
on December 24th near the intersection of 17th and Camp-
bell A venue. "\Vere you on the street car in question Y 
· A. Yes, sir. 
page 82 ~ Q. Where did you get on the street carY 
A. One block from the end of the car line. 
Q. What seat did you occupy~ 
A. I occupied the operator's seat in the rear. 
Q. How were you sitting in the operator's seat? 
A. I was sitting side,vays, face forward in the direction the 
car was going. 
Q. Were there any other passengers on the street car? 
A. Another lady. 
Q. Did the street car stop when it approached the grade 
crossing of the Southern Railroad side Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you looking in the direction the street car was 
proceeding at that time Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I will ask you whether or not you saw an automobile 
coming towards the way you were traveling, opposite to the 
way you were traveling on Campbell Avenue. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where was the automobile 'vhen you first saw it f 
A. When I first saw it it was up there on the other side 
of the Norfolk and Western Railway trestle. 
Q. Did the street car come to a stop before it made the 
curve into 17th StreetY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was there a motorcycle on either side of the street car f 
A. It was on the right-hand side of the street 
page 83 ~ going towards Fairview I-Ieights. 
Q. Could you see any lights from the motorcyele f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What light could you see? 
A. I could see the headlight of it. 
Q. How could you see it Y 
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A. Through the glass on the side of it. 
Q. Did you pay any particular attention to the automobile 
coming down Campbell Avenue towards you? Did you watch 
it? 
A. I watched it until it got right there on it and I thought 
it would come to a stop and I looked again on the side. When 
I looked back again I saw the operator of the car jmn.p up 
and I heard the collision betwen the two and he opened the 
door and we went out and investigated and I saw the rear 
light of the motorcycle burning. 
Q. You saw the rear light of the motorcycle burning? 
.lt. Yes, sir. 
Q. You said the operator got up. Which way did he get 
up? 
A. He threw his leg on the side and jumped back a couple 
of steps to the bar in the middle of the car. 
Q. Did you look in the street to see if there were any skid 
marks? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see any? 
A. No, sir. 
page 84 ~ Q. Did you see any evidences of the wreck in the 
street7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did you see there? 
A. I saw some parts of the motor of the car. 
·Q. Was the car badly damaged Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Prior to the time of the collision did you notice the 
motorman make any signals to anyoneY 
A. Yes, sir. I saw him motion to the driver of the motor-
cycle to go forward while he was standing still to wait for 
him to pass the motorcycle, and after that the ca.r was coming 
under the Norfolk and vVestern trestle at that time. I looked 
again and the car was right on it and came right on into it. 
Q. Could you tell how fast the automobile was going that 
ran into the street carT 
A. To my estimate· he was making over twenty-five. 
Q. Over twenty-five miles an hour? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you hear any signs of any; brakes being put on by 
the automobile prior to the collision 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. From your observation after the wreck-first I will ask 
you this, whether or not the speed was checked or did it 
continue at the same speed? 
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A. It looked to me it continued its same rate of speed. 
_ Q. When you got out of the car did you look 
page 85 ~ at the 0 motorcycle Y 
A. 'yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know whether the rear light was_ burning, the 
taillight? 
·A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was it or not? 
A. It was. 
Q. Do you know what became of the other passenger on the 
f;treet car that you spoke off 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Did she get off at the scene of the accident Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know who she was? 
A. No, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. You sa.y the motorcycle was standing there and the 
automobile did not stop but continued at the same rate of 
speedY 
A. It looked that way. 
Q. 0 You told us a moment ago you thought the automobile 
was going to stop. What made you think it was going to stop Y 
A. He saw the street car standing there and I thought he 
would stop like all other cars. 
Q. You were sitting on the rear of the street car f 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 86 ~ Q. And you had to look out the glass past the 
motorman to see all of this, did yon? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You did see the motorman motion twice for the driver 
of the motorcycle to pass on, did you T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Twice or more than that? 
A. Twice. 
Q. And at that time the automobile was back up there 
under that trestle, wasn't it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. 1Vhile he was coming the distance from that trestle back 
up there the motorman of tl1e street car and the operator 
?,f the motorcycle were each standing there, each one beckon-
Ing to the other one to go on T 
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A. I don't know about the driver of the motorcycle motion-
ing but I saw the operator of the car motion. 
Q. How long did they stand there in all, the motorman 
beckoning to the man to go ahead 7 
A. They stood there about a couple of minutes. 
Q. Why did you notice so particularly the red light on the 
back of this motorcycle 7 
A. Because I went to the rear of the car and saw it burn-
ing. 
Q. Why were ·you so much interested? You didn't own 
either the motorcycle or the automobile, did you f 
A. No, sir. 
page 87 r Q. You were making an investigation, I suppose. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You weren't a witness in the police court when this 
matter came up, were you? _ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You never told the officer who made the investigation 
anything about it, did you, at the time? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You wer-e there when the police officer came, weren't 
you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
. Q. You didn't go up and tell them you were on the street 
car? 
A. He asked me was I on the car. 
Q. You told him you were on the street car? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you tell him you got out and made an investigation 
before his arrival? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you tell him anything about seeing part of the motor 
of the automobile lying ou; on the road? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What part of the motor of the automobile did you see 
lying out there 7 
A. I don't know anything about a car and I couldn't say 
what part of the motor was lying there. 
Q. You told us they were parts of it. 
A. I knowed they were some iron parts. 
Q. You said they were parts of the motor of 
page 88} the automobile. I want to know what parts. 
A. I don't know what parts it was. They were 
iron parts and that is the only part that is made of iron. 
Q. Couldn't it have been part of the other motorcycle that' 
·was in the other side car 7 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. There was another motorcycle inside of the motorcycle 
side car, wasn't it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
The witness stands aside. 
H. E. MAYHEW, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIR.ECT EXAMINATION. 
By ~Ir. Frost: 
Q. You are Mr. H. E. Mayhew? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you the motorman on the street car at the time 
of the accident about which this suit is brought? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Which 'vay was the street car going? 
A. The street car was coming from Fairview Heights to-
ward town on Campbell Avenue. 
Q. Just tell us what you recall in regard to the accident. 
A. Well, I came on down there at the railroad and stopped 
and opened the door which is the company's rules, 
page 89 ~ and I got about half way then from the railroad 
down to this trestle where I stopped and when I 
noticed this motorcycle coming out of 17th and crossing 
Campbell. I kept slowly coming down to the po~nt of the 
curve and just as I entered the point of the curve where the 
track led off of Campbell Avenue the motorcycle pulled over 
to the curb, about that distance (indicating). 
Q. What would you say that distance is¥ 
A. About a foot and a half. 
Q. About eig·hteen inches Y 
A. About eighteen inches from the curb and he stopped 
and I stopped, both about the same time. 
Q. Why did you stop? 
A. Simply because I knew if I didn't the swing of the car 
would side swipe him and that was what I was afraid of. The 
motorcycle might have made it through there. I wouldn't 
like to say. I motion him to go and l1e did the same way 
and I did him the second time and when I did it the second 
time I noticed the car coming down between those two trestles. 
After I motioned him the second time he speeded his motor 
up to start and I wouldn't say he moved his machine but about 
that time I seen the automobile wasn't going to stop and I 
said to myself, ''Lord have mercy, he is going. to kill those two 
boys'', and about that time I wheeled on my right foot back 
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into the car and he sideswiped the motorcycle and collided 
into the street car, the left front of the automo-
page 90 ~ bile hitting the left front of the street car. 
· Q. Is that considered a dangerous place there 7 
By Mr. Jordan (interposing): Just let him describe it. 
I object to his opinion and the jury can tell as well as he 
whether it is dangerous. 
By Mr. Frost: I will change the question. 
Q. Is it customary for street cars to stop at that place? 
By Mr. Jordan: I object to that. 
Bv the Court: That objection is overruled. The other 
one ··was well taken. 
A. It is a dangerous place. 
By Mr. Frost: 
Q. Just tell whether or not it is custo:rnary to stop under 
those circumstances. 
A. It is customary to stop if you see an automobile coming 
down. They both can ~t go around together. The operator 
stops to give them the right of way because if they don't 
1 t will cause an a.ccident. 
Q. Were the lights burning on the motorcycle? 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you please state whether the automobile and the 
street car were hung together f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How 'vere they hung! 
page 91} A. If you notice in the front of the street car, 
under tl1e car, there are two strips that are called 
the tripper which trips the fender which is further under 
the car. When you hit those strips it trips the fender down 
on the street and the bumper of the automobile was hung 
behind this tripper, and to get it aloose it took several men 
to get on the bumper to mash it down and slip it back before 
they could get it out. 
Q. Was there an arc light in that intersection Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I will ask you whether or not the light from the arc 
light lighted the intersection sufficiently to see the motorcycle 
and see objects for a distance of itwo hundred feet . 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was the headlight of your street car lighwdt 
.A. Yes, sir .. 
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Q. Did that reflect on the motorcycle Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. You say the headlight of your street car showed up on 
the motorcycle Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How far 'vas the motorcycle from the street car! 
A. I judge about twelve feet. 
Q. Twelve feetf 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 92 } Q. You mean the headlight of the street carY 
A. Yes, sir, it covered the motorcycle. 
Q. It caught on the front and side and not on the rear from 
which the automobile ·was approaching? 
A. No, sir, it didn't cover the rear of course. 
Q. Isn't it true the light on your street car is converged 
to the front? 
A. Yes, sir, certainly it is to the front, but further in front 
ahead of. you it spreads o'ut like this (indicating). 
Q.. The strongest portion of the light is ahead f 
A. The strongest portion of the light is ahead, but twelve 
or fifteen feet ahead of you it covers the whole street. 
Q. Have you been to this place, Mr. Mayhew,_ to observe 
whether there is enough light there at night for a person to 
see a motorcycle standing where this one was if they are 
approaching from 12th Street and there is a street car stand-
ing still 'vith its headlight shining in your face? 
A. I have been there at night but not for that particular 
purpose. I have been past there enough to know yon can 
tell that. 
Q. Did you mean to tell the jury that the ·headlight from 
the street car wouldn't interfere 'vith one's vision coming 
from the direction the automobile was comingf 
A. No, sir, I don't think it would. The headlight is not 
strong enough for that at that distance. 
Q. Not strong enough to blind him so he conldn 't see where 
he was going? _ 
page 93 ~ A. No, sir. Now, he was coming down on his 
right and I was in the center of the street. If he 
had been looking the light in the fact like I am in your eye 
it would blind him naturaUy, but I was to the right of him·· 
in the center of the street. 
Q. Coming down Campbell Avenue there is a sort of kink 
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in the road coming down here. Wouldn't that headlight be 
shining straight in his face? 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. You say that the headlight wasn't sufficient to blind or 
interfere with his vision but it was enough to show up the 
motorcycle? 
A. To cover the motorcycle. Here is the question: When 
I saw the danger of this automobile· hitting something he was 
as close to the motorcycle as from here to that post (about 
six or eight feet) right in line 'vith the motorcycle and I 
didn't see anything else for him to do but go over top of it, 
but he wheeled. I didn't see him do that, but he undoubtedly 
did because he didn't go over top of it. He was on that 
side. 
Q. He cut sharply to his left and hit the street car 1 
A. He sideswiped the motorcycle· and dragged it. Several 
of us got out and pulled it aloose from the automobile. 
Q. Did you examine all the lights on the motorcycle? 
A. No, sir, I did not. 
Q. Could you say whether the rear light of the 
page 94 ~ motorcycle was burning T 
. A. Everything but the tail light. I never did· 
look at that. I didn't examine the motorcycle close more 
than to get it aloose from the automobile. 
Q. Who was on the street car a.t the time? 
A. This colored boy you had as a witness, Stanford Deane, 
and a colored woman but she got away and I never did see 
her any more. I never got her name. 
Q. Now, you have told us, Mr. Mayhew, that it was im-
possible for a street car to come around that curve· and a 
vehicle to pass at the same time. · 
A. No, sir, I didn't say that. 
Q. Didn't you say that both can't go around there to-
gether¥ . 
A. I didn't say that. I said it was dangerous and might 
cause an accident if they undertook it. A motorcycle might 
hug that curb and get ·by and an automobile might make it, 
but I don't know. 
Q. Didn't you say that you knew if you went around there 
'vhile this motorcycle was passing you would sideswipe it 7 
A. If he didn't lay over to the curb I would. 
Q. It is not impossible for a vehicle to pass through there, 
is it? 
A. I don't know that. I know it is dangerous. I didn 't_say 
it was impossible. · 
Q. It is dangerous over here on Grace Street between Pearl 
and Harrison too, isn't it? 
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page 95 ~ A. Yes, sir, I have more trouble there than l· 
do here. 
Q. Automobiles go up and down there, don't they? 
A. I stop three or four tin1es a day to let them by. 
Q. You have driven up there when automobiles were com-
ing down, haven't you 1 
A. Coming down is not like going up. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Frost: 
Q. I will ask you whether the street car was placed by you 
out at the scene of the accident on March 6th when the pictures 
were taken by Mr. Bremer and measurements n1ade by ~fr. 
DeMott. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where did you place the street car 1 
A. Right directly where the accident happened. The reason 
I know is there is a joint in the rail right about where I 
stopped before and when I aimed to get out that night I threw 
on the emergency and it piled up sand and thatis the reason 
I know. 
Q. Was that the same street carY 
A. The same. ear. 
Q. The same car that the pictures were taken of tot~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Some question was asked you about the taillight of the 
motorcycle. Did you see anyone testing the taillight? 
A. Well, Mr. Reynolds 'vhen he got the boys' 
page 96 ~ names who were riding the motorcycle asked him 
if he had his lights burning and he asked him if 
he had his taillight burning and he said it was. 
By :rvrr. Jordan: I object to hearsay testimony. 
By the Court : 
Q. You answer the question asked by Mr. Frost. Did 
you see any testing made of the lights Y 
A. No more than he asked him if the tail light was burning 
and he looked around to see and that is all I seen. The 
officer never said anything about it but he did look. 
Q. Was the front light burning! 
A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Frost: 
Q. Was the front light of the motorcycle burning when 
you signaled him to go forward Y 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You stated that the headlight of the street car will 
blind you if you are right in front of it 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. liow far a.'vay f1·om the str-eet ear do you have to get 
to keep it from blinding you 7 
A. I wouldn't like to say, but the closer you got to the 
light the worse it would blind you naturally. You would 
have to be in line with it, but at that distance the automo-
bile being on the side and the street car in the center it 
wouldn't blind you enough not to see where you 
page 97 } were going. 
Q. Did you state when you saw the automobile 
it was headed directly towards the motorcycle 7 
A. Yes, sir .. 
Q. Was it proceeding in that same· direction the whole time 
you saw the automobile f 
A. Yes, sir .. 
Q. Beading right toward the motorcycle 7 
A. Yes, sir .. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By ~ir. Jordan: 
Q. Mr. Mayhew, the Mr. Reynolds you speak of is the police 
officer who testified awhile ago, isn't he' 
A. Yes, sir. 
The witness stands aside. 
B. P. KNOWLES, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXA~IINATION .. 
By Mr. Frost-: 
Q. Are you Mr. B. P. l{nowlest 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where do you workt 
A. For Mr. Pratt .. 
Q. Did you see this accident between the Miles automo ... 
bile and the street car and motorcycle belonging to Mr. Pratt y 
A. No, sir. 
page 98} Q. Did you come by the accident after it hap-
pened? 
A. Yes, sir, about fifteen minutes after, I .think. 
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Q. Did you see any skid marks or did you look for any skid 
marks behind the automobile! 
A. No, sir, but I didn't see any. 
Q. Did you look for any¥ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You did not look for any skid marks Y 
A. No1 sir. Q. Did you see the motorcycle f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you drive a motorcycle Y · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you understand the working of the lighting system 
of motorcycles 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. If you turn on . the light of a motorcycle do the head-
light and the rear light work together¥ 
A. Yes, sir, they work together. · 
Q. If you turn on the switch for the lights what happens f 
A. Both lights go on. 
Q. Both headlight and tail light Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was the tail light burning on the motorcycle when you 
got theref 
A. When I got there, no. 
Q. Where was the motorcycle setting Y 
page 99 ~ A. Over next to the right curb. · 
Q. Was the headlight burningf 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Are you familiar with that interse;ction Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you driven automobiles and motorcycles through 
tbat intersection 1 
A. Four or five times a day. 
Q. Ever drive through there at nightf 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Ever driven through there when street cars were ·com-
ing in the opposite direction 7 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Do you consider that situation there dangerous Y 
By Mr. Jordan (interposing): I object to t}lat. 
By the Court: Objection sustained. 
By Mr. Frost: I withdraw the question. 
·Q. Is there an arc light at that intersection! 
A. There is one ::at the upper· edge. 
Q. Is there sufficient light at that intersection-! will ask 
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you this-at the time you reached the intersection there that 
night was there sufficient light to see objects two hundred 
feet away from the motorcycle? . 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you ever driven down Campbell Ave-
·page 100 ~ nue going towards Fairview Heig·hts when a street 
car 'vas coming in the opposite direction but not 
having entered the curve f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Does the light of the street car blind you in any way 1 
Could you see 'vhere you were going? 
A. I could see where I was going. 
· Q. Where do the rays of your headlights show when you 
come down there f 
A. On the g-round u'lltil you get within a certain distance 
·of the intersection, and the farther down you go the higher 
the light rays throw. 
Q. You know where the motorcycle was when you got there? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was that on a level or on a grade? 
A. On a level. 
Q. When you arrive at a position under the Southern trestle 
at night with your headlig·hts burni·ng· would they shine where 
you saw the motorcycle at the time of the accident! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Would that obtain with a street car coming in the op-
posite direction with its headlight burning 7 
A. vVould it do which 7 
Q. Could you see just as well if a street car was coming 
in the opposite direction with its light on Y 
A. Sure. 
page 101 ~ Q. Did you help move the automobile away? 
A. No, sir, it was moved when I got there. 
Q. Did you go by Bibee's that night? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Which way were you headed f 
A. Southeast. 
Q. Going towards Fairview Heights? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When you were at Bibee's I will ask you1 whether or not 
you could see the motorcycle at the intersection. . 
A. I first applied my brakes about Bibee's or Hopkins'. 
Q. I asked y<;>u if you could see the motorcycle at the in:-
tersection. 
A. A ·crowd was there and I could see the people. 
Q. Do you know whether the button marker ''Slow'' was 
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there on the 12th Street side of the Norfolk and Western 
bridge at the time of the accident 1 
A. On the Bibee's side, yes, sir, the right-hand side. 
Q. Was it there at the time of the accident 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who left the scene of the accident first, you or the mo-
torcycle? 
A. The motorcycle. 
Q. Which way did that go? 
A. Out Campbell Avenue. 
Q. Did you follow it out~ 
page 102 }- A. "Yes, sir. 
Q. Were the lights burning at that time all 
right7 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see the motorcycle leave the scene of the ac-
cident? 
A. I was the first one to follow him. I followed him to 
the station. 
Q. To what station Y 
.A. To Pratt's station. 
Q. You followed him all the way up the street? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Could you see the lights, the rear light Y 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How far behind him 'vas it? 
A. I lost him about a block and a half going up the hill. 
CROSS EXM1INATION. 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. Did I understand you to say when you got there the 
headlights of the motorcycle 'vere not burning • 
A. No, sir. 
Q. The tail light was' 
A. No, sir, neither one was burning. 
Q. You stated that the lighting system is so hooked up 
that when you turn on the switch the front light goes on· and 
so does the rear light. It is possible for a bulb to blow out 
and the headlight burn only like any other motorcycle or au-
tomobile, isn't it Y 
page 103 ~ A. That is right. 
Q. Did I undersbtnd you to tell the jury that 
a street car standing still with its headlight 'burning as this 
one ·was and you approaching it that the light from the street 
car didn't interfere with your vision at allY 
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.A. It hadn't before. That one wasn't there when I got 
there that night. 
Q. On other occasions you can drive right in the direction 
of the street car and the headlight of the street car does not 
interfere with your vision? 
.A. No, sir .. 
Q. You work for Mr .. Pratt, I believe .. 
.A. Yes, sir .. 
Q. }Ir. Pratt, one of the defendants in this case' 
.A. Yes, sir .. 
The witness stands aside. 
V. D. FARMER, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies. as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By JVIr. Frost~ 
Q. You are V. D. Farmer? 
A. Yes, sir, V. D. Farmer, better known as Jimmy. 
Q. Do you work for Mr. Pratt? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. On the night of the 24th o:f December I will ask you 
whether or not a call was received to come to Bed-
page 104 ~ :ford A venue to get a wrecked motorcycle. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who went to get the wrecked motorcycle 7 
A. Melvin Powell and myself. 
Q. Wl1o was driving? 
A. 1\felvin Powell. 
Q. Where. did you ride on the motorcycle Y 
A. In the box. 
Q. At that time was the headlight and tail light burning 
on the motorcycle? . 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you get the wrecked motorcycle from ·Bedford Ave-
nuef 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Then you came back towards Mr. Pratt's place. When 
did you come into Campbell Avenue? · 
A. We came down 17th Street. 
0. I will ask you whether or not Melvin Powell, the op-
erator, stopped at the arterial stop before entering Camp-
bell A venue. 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Do you know whether the taillight was burning at that 
time? - -
A. Yes, sir. 
_Q. How do you know it was burning? 
A. The tail light on the motorcycle was burning. We had 
the back end of the box down, the motorcycle was too long to 
go all the way in the box, and we had to let the 
page 105 ~ rear end of the box down and I had a chain hold-
ing it and I had to watch that to keep it from 
slipping up so the back end of the motorcycle wouldn't fall 
out and that is kind of back a foot behind the taillight and 
I was watching that chain and I could see the taillight there. 
Q. Did Melvin Powell proceed into Campbell Avenue? Did 
he go into Campbell Avenue from 17th Street and make his 
turn!- -
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What happ:ened then r Did he proceed out Campbell 
A venue or stop? 
A. He stopped. 
Q. What was the cause of him stopping¥ 
A. The street car was coming down and Mr. Mayhew, the 
motorman, saw us and he stopped and Mr. Mayhew motioned 
for us to go on and Powell motioned for him to go. Then 
Mr. Mayhew motioned for us to go again and then we started 
out. He sped up his motor to start. I don't know whether 
we moved or not. I hollered ''look out''. I noticed the flash 
of light on the rear fender of the motorcycle and I hollered 
"look out". H.e stopped and throwed his leg up and about 
that time the car came down, sideswiped· the motorcycle and 
into the front ·of the car. 
Q. Where did the car come from? · 
A. It came from 12th Street on Campbell Avenue. . 
Q. Was the taillight burning on the motorcycle at the time 
of the impact f · 
A. It was burning when he turned out of 17th 
:gage 106 ~ Street. . 
Q. Did you notice· it any more? 
A. I noticed it after the accident when he asked us about 
the tail light. · 
Q~ Was it burning thenf 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you actually see it burning? Were you l~oking·- at 
it. when it· came into the intersection? 
. ,.A. Yes, ·sir,. it had been darl{ and I wanted to see if the 
chain was down on there good and when we got t~ the ligl~.t I 
happened to look over there at the time. 
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Q. Did you look at this picture¥ Take this picture and 
. show the jury where you were sitting in this side car. 
A. Right here on the rear. This gate was setting straight 
out. .A chain from here running from the top of here to 
here. The end of the motorcycle was setting out on this gate 
and I 'vas sitting over here right on the end of this holding 
the machine up. .'Vhy I could tell the tail light was burning 
over here was because I was watching the chain on this end 
and I could see the tail light. 
By one of the Jury : 
Q. This machine you were holding in, was it in any way 
over the tail light 1 
A. It was high enough to miss it. I was sitting on this 
edge here, the right-hand side of the side car. 
1\{r. Frost (continues) : 
Q. Was there anything that would obscure your light, your 
tail light, from being seen by anybody' Was 
page 107 ~ there anything on the motorcycle to cover up the 
taillight even though it was burning to keep one 
from seeing it? 
·A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you have an opportunity to see the Miles automobile 
any tinw before the impact T 
A. When I first saw the automobile it was right back from 
us, I will say about four foot. I just could see it. 
Q. I will ask you whether you followed it in your vision 
until it stopped, until it hit the street car. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Could you get any idea about the speed of the automo-
bile? 
A. I couldn't say. It was going pretty fast. L would say 
around thirty-five· miles in my estimation. 
Q. Did you look at the d~mage done to the automobile? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Give us· some idea of that'. 
A. It bent the left front of it back and I think it was the 
bumper or something that hung under the street car. I think 
.it broke the front light out. It tore the light up. 
Q. Was the radiator damaged' . 
A. Yes, sir, right bad. . . 
· Q. Do you know whether the automobile could move away 
under its own power? 
A. I 'vas there. We had· to get JIP on the bumper·, four 
or five of us, to get the bumper aloose by jumping up and 
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down, and we couldn't turn the steering wheel 
page 108 ~ and we had to turn it the way the wheels were 
cut over to the iron railing. 
Q. Where is that railing¥ 
A. On the left-hand side going towards Fairview Heights. 
Q. From the time that you had observed the automobile 
I will ask you whether or not you noticeq any checking i'Il 
its speed, or did it continue at the same rate of speed. 
A. It looked like it just kept right on. It didn't look like 
it checked any. 
Q. Did you hear any noise of any brakes being applied? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you make any investigation to see if any skid marks 
were on the street behind the automobile 7 
A. I looked around but I didn't see any. 
CROSS EXAJ\1INATION. 
By Mr~ Jordan: 
Q. Mr. Farmer, did you tell us that the automobile could 
move under its own power after it was disengaged from the 
street car or that it could not? 
A. I didn't see it. After we. got it out from under there 
and shoved it back to the other side that is where I left it 
setting·, over beside the railing. 
Q. What part of the automobile was left lying in the street 
there? 
A. I .didn't notice any. 
Q. You didn't notice any f 
A. No, sir. 
page 109 } Q. Did you hear any metal parts of the motor 
fall off while von were there? You would have 
heard them, don't you think f 
A. Right at the tiine of the accident I don't imagine I 
would. I was all excited and I don't know whether I 'vould 
or not. 
Q. I believe you testified in police court, did you not? 
A. Yes, sir.· 
Q. Down there yon said simply that the rear light was 
burning. 
By Mr. Frost: Your :Honor, I object to this line of testi-
mony unless he produces soine witness. I take it he is evi-
dently cross examining as to some prior statement and I 
object· to that lien of testimony unless he has someone to tes-
tify as to what he said in police court. 
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By the Court: Mr. Jordan seems to be acting as his own 
witness without being sworn. 
By Mr. Jordan: I am asking him as regarding his previous 
testimony. 
By the Court: You must frame your question differently. 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. You testified in the police court, did you not f 
A. Yes) sir. 
page 110 ~ Q. Did you regarding the red tail light alleged 
to have been on the rear of the motorcycle testify 
to more down there than the fact that it was burning? 
A. I testified it was burning. 
Q. Did you down there explain about some chain and so 
forth to hold up this other motorcycle that was in the boxY 
A. No, sir. I just said I was sitting in the box. I didn't 
explain that. 
Q. You didn't explain any of that at all down there Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. For what distance did you see the automobile approach-
ing you? · 
A. I would say about four feet. 
Q. Four feet 1 
A. That is as far as I saw it. 
Q. You saw the automobile moving a distance of four feet 
:and you are ready to tell the court and jury,-
By ~Ir. Frost {interposing): He said four feet away when· 
he first saw it. 
By Mr. Jordan: That is what I asked him. 
Q. The car was four or five feet behind you when you saw 
it? 
A. I saw the headlig·ht then. 
Q. You saw the automobile travel a distance of four or five 
feet? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 111 } Q. You are willing to tell the court and jury it 
was going thirty-five miles an hour or more? 
A. I wouldn't say: for certain, but it was going very fast. 
Q. You base that on seeing it going only four feet Y 
A. I know it was going fast. I don't say it was going 
thirty -five. 
Q. Did you see Officer Reynolds Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see him get the number off of the motorcycle Y 
A. I don't know. He walked over to the motorcycle and 
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looked at the lights. He cut the ·lights on and looked back 
there. · 
Q. Didn't he have to use his flashlight to get the number 
of the motorcycle, his own flashlight Y 
A. I don't know. I don't recall whether he did or not. 
RE-DIRECT EXA~1INATION. 
By Mr. Frost: 
Q. Did anybody ask you any question about any chain at 
police court Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Mr. Jordan made reference to the number on the mo-
torcycle. What kind of number was he referring to 7 
A. The license number, I reckon. 
page 112 ~ By Mr. Jordan: I should have said the license 
number when I said the motorcycle number. 
. Q. The motorcycJe license number is right under or at the 
red light, isn't itY 
A. Yes, sir. 
·Q. And the rear light is supposed to show on the license 
plate number so you can read it without any difficulty, isn't 
itf 
A. Yes, sir. 
The witness stands aside. 
MEL:VIN 0. POWELL, 
having been first drily sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Frost: 
Q. What is your name f 
A. Melvin 0. Powell. 
· · Q. Who do you work for, Melvin? 
A. Mr. Pratt. · 
' . 
Q. Who were you working for on December 24th, 1934 Y 
A. Mr. Pratt. 
Q. Were you orde'red to go to Bedford A venue on the night 
of December 24th, 1934, to get a wrecked motorcycle f 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Who was with you? 
· · .A. Jimmy Farmer. 
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Q. You got the motorcycle and was coming back to Pratt's 
place? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 113 ~ Q. How did you enter Campbell A venue? 
A. I came around 17th Street. 
Q. Was your headlight burning at that time? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know whether your tail light was burning at 
that time? 
A. It was burning when I loaded the machine on. That 
'vas the only thing I had to throw a light to see how to put 
it up in the box. · 
Q. I will ask you whether or not you stopped at the arterial 
street stop. 
A. Yes, sir, I pulled up to the arterial street. The car 
was pulling over the railroad track and both of us pulled 
up about the same time. I stopped at the curb and motioned 
to him and he motioned for me. 
Q. Why did you stop? 
A. I never pass cars in that curve. Th~y sway around 
and I had this machine and it was likely to throw over and 
hit the handle bars or something and I wouldn't pass. 
Q. Just tell us what happened. You stopped and the street 
car stopped and what happened? 
A. He motioned to me. Then I motioned to him and he 
motioned to me again. I started to start out and Jimmy hol-
lered "look out" and about the time he did that I raised my 
leg up and over the machine and the Ford came around· and 
hit the street car. 
Q. Were you out at the scene of the accident 
page 114 ~ on ~farch 6th when ~fr. DeMott was making meas-
urements and ~fr. Bremer was taking pictures? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. I will ask you whether or not you placed the machine 
for them and just whe~e you placed it. 
A. Just where it was hit. The street car and the motor-
cycle were both setting at the same place, as good as I could 
think, where it was that night. . · 
Q. Was that the identical motorcycle and side car? 
A. The same machine. 
Q. Did you make any investigation for skid marks or look 
for skid marks of the automobile Y . 
A. Not particularly. 
Q. Did you see any f 
A. No," sir. . 
Q. Did you hear any skreaking of brakes or noise of brakes 
being applied T 
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A. No, sir, I did not. When Jimmy hollered that was the 
first I knew of it. 
Q. How far was the automobile away when you first saw 
it? 
A. It hit the street car and bounded back, it looked to 
me, when I saw it. I never did see it until after it hit the 
car. 
Q. Was the automobile going fast? vVas the blow a hard 
one or moderate? 
A. It hit mighty hard. It took the front 'vheel and all 
plumb back under the fender. 
page 115 ~ Q. It took the front wheel of the automobile 
where? 
A. Back under the fender of the car, under the automo-
bile. · 
Q. After the accident happened did you notice the tail 
light on your motorcycle? 
A. Mr. Reynolds asked n1e if it was burning and I told 
him yes. He turned them on and I cut them back off. 
Q. Does the headlight and tail light operate on the same 
switch? 
A. Yes, the headlight and tail lig·ht work by the same 
switch. 
Q. Was there a bad bulb in the tail light? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Was your headlig·ht burning at the time of the acci-
dentY 
A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. How do you know the taillight was burning at the time 
of the accident? 
A. I loaded the machine by it. It was a dark place where 
I loaded the machine and I had the light to see by. 
Q. That was over on Bedford Avenue? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the accident was on Campbell Avenue? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How do you know it was burning then Y 
page 116 ~ A. Jimmy said it was burning. 
Q. I am not asking you about what Jimmy 
said. 
A. I know it was burning when I left Bedford Avenue. 
Q. It IJ1.ight ha:ve gone out. 
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A. I might have got killed between there and over here 
too .. 
. Q. You don't know it was burning at the time of the acci-
dent. 
A. No, sir, I couldn't swear to it, but it was burning after 
the accident, because I turned them on to show Mr. Reyn-
olds. 
Q. Mr. Reynolds didn't tell us anything about that this · 
1norning. 
A. You didn't ask him. ; 
Q. I thought you were supposed to be setting back in the 
other room. 
A. I have been in here all the time. 
Q. That's right, you are one of the defendants. When 
Mr. Reynolds went to get the license number off the back 
of that motorcycle he had to use his own flashlight, didn't 
heY 
.A. I can't remember whether he did or not. When he 
asked me about the light I cut them on and cut them back off. 
He was taking down names and numbers and everything. 
. Q. Did you see him take the license number off of the 
motorcycle? 
.A. No, sir, I didn't see him. I was helping push the car 
or something. 
page 117 ~ Q. What part of the automobile dropped down 
into the street Y 
• A. I didn't see anything but the glass. 
Q. The colored boy testified awhile ago that he saw part 
of the motor. Did you see anything like that? 
A. No, sir, I wasn't hunting for anything like that. 
Q. You were in the motorcycle and would have heard them 
if they had dropped on the street. 
A. I heard the glass. 
Q. You would have seen the parts of the motor lying around 
in the street Y 
A. I reckon I would if they had been there, but I couldn't 
say. I wasn't looking for parts of the motor. 
Q. You were looking for skid marks. 
A. Yes, sir, but I wasn't looking for parts of an automo-
bile. 
Q. If you were looking for skid marks and saw any part of 
an automobile you would have noticed it, wouldn't you? 
A. I don't know whether I would have or not . 
. , The witness stands aside. 
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page 118 ~ S. FRANK PRATT, 
having been first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By _Mr! Frost: 
Q. You are Mr. S. Frank Pratt, the defendant in this case, 
are you! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I will ask you whether or not you had any knowledge 
that a claim was being made against you prior to the institu-
tion of this suit. 
A. No, sir. 
By Mr. J orda11: I don't see how that is relevant and I ask 
your Honor to strike that out. 
By the Court: What materiality has that T 
·By Mr. Frost: I think it is a matter that might be argued 
one way or the other to the jury. A complainant has a right 
to bring suit without any notice at all. 
. By the Court: That makes it immaterial. It has no bear-
ing on the case and I strike it out. 
Mr. Frost (continues): 
Q. I will ask you Mr. Pratt if Mr. Miles, the owner of the 
car came to see you early Christmas morning about the ac-
cident. o 
A. Yes, sir. · 
page 119 ~ By Mr. Jordan: I object to t~at. ·Mr. Miles, 
the owner of the car, is the father of Miss Miles, 
the plaintiff. · ·· 1 : i' 
By Mr. Frost: My purpose in asking that question is this: 
Mr. Thomas Miles was acting as agent or servant for the 
father of this lady and 1\fr. Thomas 1\files testified on the 
witness stand he told them all the facts of _the accident, and 
Mr. 1\files is also the next friend in this suit. 
By the Court: What Mr. Miles may have said his nephew 
told him or didn't tc ll him couldn't be introduced through. 
this witness. It would be purely heresay. 
By Mr .. Frost: The action of Mr. Miles the father of this 
lady, not on what he said happened but his action based on 
the information given by his servant would seem to me to be 
admissible. 
By the Court: I don't see that it has any evidential 
value. 
By Mr. Frost: He is a nominal party to this suit. 
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By the Court: Even if he is an actual party to the suit 
if he has no personal knowledge of what happened what he 
may have said about it couldn't be taken as evidence of what 
happened. 
By Mr. Frost: Even though his servant and 
page 120 ~ agent testified or explained to him how the ac-
cident happened f 
By the Court: I think not. 
By Mr. Frost: We except to the Court's ruling. 
By the Court: I will give you an exception, but he did not 
know anything about it except what somebody told him and 
he can't be examined as to that. 
The witness stands aside. 
By ~fr. Frost: I want to introduce the section of the City 
Ordinance in regard to lights on parked vehicles~ 
''Section 242, City Code, 1931. '' ''Lights on· parked ve-
hicles.'' 
''Whenever a vehicle is parked or stopped upon a highway 
whether attended or unattended during the times mentioned 
in Section two hundred ·and thirty-eight (238) there shall be 
displayed upon such vehicle one or more lamps projecting a 
white light visible under normal atmospheric conditions from 
a distance of five hundred feet to the front of such vehicle 
and projecting a red or yellow light visible under like con-
ditions from a distance of five hundred feet to the rear ex-
cept that no lights need be displayed upon any such vehicle 
when parked upon any highway where there is sufficient light 
to reveal any· persons within a distance of two 
page 121 ~ hundred feet upon such highways.'' . 
The times mentioneq in section 238 of the same code are : 
''During the period from a half hour after sunset to a half 
hour before sunrise and at any other time when there is not 
sufficient light to render clearly discernible any person on 
the highway at a distance of two hundred feet ahead.'' . 
By the Court: Any further testimony! 
By 1\fr. Frost: The defense rests. 
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THOl\tiAS MILES, 
recalled on his former oath, testifies as follows : 
EXAl\tiiNATION. 
By Mr. Jordan: . 
Q. It has been testified here, as you have heard, by Mr. 
B. P. Knowles, V. D .. Farmer that the taillight on this mo-
torcycle was burning at the time of the accident. I believe 
you yourself heretofore testified regarding that. I will ask 
you the further question whether or not when the police of-
ficer Reynolds was there taking· the license number on the mo-
torcycle he could use the rear light to get it or whether or 
not he used his own flashlight .. 
page 122 ~ A. He used his flashlight. Q. VVere you thereY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see him do it f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was the tail light burning at that time? 
A. No, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Frost: 
Q. The tail light did burn after that, didn't it f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. It didn't' 
A. I didn't see it burn. 
Q. You never did see it burn at any time 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you see Officer Reynolds make any test as to 
whether the tail light would burn or not? 
A. I didn't see him turn them on but I seen him 'vhen he 
had to get his flashlight to get the license number. 
Q. He had the flashlight to get your number too, didn't 
heY 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Didn't he use his flashlight to make his investigation 
around the scene of the accident f He had his flashlight out, 
didn't he, when he was investigating the accident? 
A. My headlights and the street car's too were 
page 123 ~ on. 
Q. Did J\fr. Reynolds have his flashlight on to 
investigate the accident 1 
A. No. 
Q. He did not have it f 
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A. He took it out of his pocket when he took the license 
number. 
Q. That is the only time he took his flashlight out of his 
pocket1 
A. I don't know whether that 'vas the only time or not 
but he took it out then. 
Q. IS'n't it a fact that you only saw the motorcycle when 
you were right on it¥ 
A. I didn't see it until I was right at it Y 
Q. Isn't that a fact that you didn't see the motorcycle 
until you were right at it 7 
A. No, sir. 
Q. It is not a fact Y 
By the Court: What is rebuttal about that? Yon had the 
opportunity of asking all of that when he was on the stand 
before. 
By Mr. Frost : I know that but I was trying to develop it. 
He wouldn't talk for me. 
By the Court: You have been oyer all of that before and 
if you couldn't get him to talk the'n he won't now. ~hat is 
his failing apparently. We can't go over all of that ground 
again. 
The witness stands aside. 
page 124} JANIE F. MILES, 
recalled on her former oath, testifies as follows: 
EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. When yon testified this morning I believe yon did not 
testify regarding the tail light on the motorcycle. 
By Mr. Frost: T;Ilis is not rebuttal testimony and I object 
to this question on the ground tha.t on direct testimony he 
would have an opportunitv to ask that question, but this is 
rebuttal testimony. .. 
By the Court: He hasn't developed the question yet. 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. You did not testify regarding that. You have since 
heard Mr. Knowles and Mr. Farmer and perhaps others say 
that at the time of the accident and just before it the tail 
light on the motorcycle was burning. Would yon please tell 
\ 
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us. whether or not the tail light on the motorcycle was burn-
ing just before the accident and at the time of the accident? 
A. It was not burning. 
· By Mr. Frost: I want to abide by the Court's ruling but 
I want to ask this question: . 
· · Q. What opportunity did you have to see the tail light 
burning on the motorcycle f 
A. Don't you think if there was a red light we 
page 125 ~ would have been able to see it? · 
. Q. I want to kno'v what opportunity you had 
to see it. 
A. Don't you think I could have seen it? 
Q. Was the vision clear in front of you all the way to 
where the motorcycle was? . 
.A. What do you mean' . 
Q. Was anything between you and the motorcycle? 
.A. No, sir, there was not. 
Q. You. didn't see the motorcycle until you got right on 
it, did you? 
A. No, sir, we certainly did not. 
The witness stands aside. 
By Mr. Jordan: We rest. 
End of all testimony. 
page 126 ~ IN CHAMBERS. 
By the Court: I don't think I will give these instructions 
because of their· verbosity. Gentlemen, frankly what is the 
use of clouding the issues here Y The only testimony ap-
parently that I recall upon which a recovery for the plain-
tiff· could by any possibility be sustained would be whether 
or not the jury believes from a preponderance of the evidence 
the motorcycle had a red rear light on it, or if it· didn't 
whether the accident happened at a place where a light was 
not necessary under the ordinance of the city that was read 
there and that the absence of such lights was not essential. 
Now, what else is there in the caseY 
By 1\fr. Frost: Your Honor please, I think that the jury 
would have a right to say, for instance, to be instructed on 
the question of the happening of an accident. Sometime~ 
that confuses them. -The happening of an accident places 
no responsibility on any one. I think they should be in-
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structed that if the injury was a result of the negligence of 
Thomas ~files there could be no recovery. I think my friend, 
Mr. Jordan, should be confined in his argument to the ques-
-tion of emergency. In other words, these people did not stop 
foolishly. Our contention is they stopped be-
page 127 ~ cause they were facing a danger that really ex-
isted. · 
By the Court: They had a right to stop. There is noth-
ing, with deference to 1\:lr. Jordan, in his contention. They 
had a right to stop providrng they used the precautions which 
the law required which was the carrying of a light or stopping 
in a place that they could be seen. 
By l\1r. Jordan: Your Honor, our contention is not merely 
that they stopped unnecessarily but unnecessarily long which 
is really the cause of the accident. It was testified that when 
. the street car stopped he motioned for the motorcycle to 
1l:o and they were doing the polite thing for each other. 
'fhe whole time this automobile was coming down the hill. 
'l,he n1otorman said "I saw the automobile coming when I 
told him to go on". Then all the time the automobile was 
npproacl~ing ?n<;l. they stopped and blocked the street un-
:ilecessarlly long. . 
By the Court: Does the performance of the Alphonso and 
Gaston act a matter of ·negligence? I don't think so. They 
-l1ad a right to stop there provided they exercised the care 
that the la'v required, which was that they carry" a red light 
at the rear. Your people, the people driving your car were 
alike under a duty to take care, to keep watch for people 
stopping in front of them. The degree of care that is due 
to be observed by parties stopping in the highway is to ob-
Rerve the precautions which the law provides against col-
lisions. In this case a collision from the rear and 
pHge 1.28 ~ the provision that the law requires is. that they 
should carry_ this r~d light on the rear unless 
t.hey are stoppi•ng in a pla~e where .a light is not needed and 
the motorcycle could be seen without the light. It would be 
ne~dig·ence if they didn't have the light or if they stopped at 
a place where a light was not provided otherwise and whether 
they stopped two minutes or five minutes or ten minutes, 
and there is no claim here that they stopped over two or three 
minutes at the most if they. had the lig-ht it is for the man 
following- behind to ·look out to see it. That is my view of it 
nnd I think if I give all of these . instructions it will merely 
eonfuse the jury. How much time do you want to argue 
this case? · 
By Mr. Frost: Half an hour on each side is sufficient. . 
.. By the Court: I will undertake to instruct the jury orally. 
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By Mr. Frost: I want to make a motion. We move, as 
attorneys for S. Frank Pratt and l\ielvin 0. Powell that the 
Court strike out the evidence as to them on the ground that 
there was no negligence shown. That the negligence proven 
was not negligence as set out in the bill of particulars or 
notice of motion and lastly, on the ground that if there was 
a failure to have the light that that was not the proximate 
but the remote cause of the accident, and therefore it being 
the remote cause the court could take no cognizance of it and 
there would be no negligence. 
page 129 ~ By the Court : I overrule your motion. 
By Mr. Frost : We except for the reasons 
stated. 
By Mr. Jordan: The plaintiff excepts to the Court's ruling 
in refusing to give such of my instructions as are refused. 
By the Court: You gentlemen may make your exceptions 
after I have concluded my instructions. I will give you an 
opportunity. 
ORAL INSTRUCTIONS. 
By the Court: Gentlemen of the jury, this is in law what 
we term a tort action, that is, it is a prosecution of a claim 
for damages alleged to have been suffered because of the 
negligence of the defendants. Negligence in law, as ap-
plied to this case being the failure to use ordinary care in 
performing the duties tha.t a traveler on the highway has. 
Now, the burden of proof in this case is upon the plaintiff, 
that is, the- person who brings the suit must establish by a 
preponderance of all of the evidence that the injuries which 
she alleges that she suffered were caused in part or in whole, 
as applied to the facts of this case, by one or more of these 
defendants, the preponderance of of evidence being 
page 130 ~ not necessarily the number of witnesses on one 
side or the number on the other, but from weigh-
ing all of the evidence, in your judgment, which outweighs 
the other. If the evidence is just evenly balanced you would 
find a verdict for the defendant because the plaintiff in that 
case would not have carried the burden of proof. Now, the 
defendants named in the declaration, which is this blue paper, 
are three. The first is the Lyncbburg Traction Light Com-
pany because of the street car that was involved in this col-
lision. The Court has held that there 'vas not sufficient evi-
dence here for you to consider at all finding damages against 
the street railway company, so it will be necessary, of course, 
to find a judgment for, the defendant so far as the Traction 
Light Company is concerned. Now the other two defend-
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ants, S. Frank Pratt, and Melvin 0. Powell, if you find a 
verdict against either one of these defendants you must find a 
verdict against both of them because there is no dispute 
about the fact that the defendant, Powell, was driving th~ 
motorcycle as the agent of the defendant, Pratt, and while . 
the verdict, if any, must depend upon the evidence as to the 
neglige:ooe, or alleged negligence, of Melvin 0. Powell, if 
the agent is responsihle the principal is re.sponsible because 
he was engaged in Mr. Pratt's busine$S as a matter of law. 
You couldn't find, for example, a verdict properly against 
either Powell or Pratt unless you find it against both in the 
same amount, as applied to the facts of this case. 
page 131 ~ Now, then, travelers on a highway have recipro-
cal duties, the duty of each to do the things which 
the law requires that they do to prevent, if they can, in-
juring somebody else or being injured themselves. As ap-
plied to the testimony in this case, for example, it was the 
duty of the driver of the car in which the plaintiff was riding 
and it was the duty of the plaintiff, to a certain degree, to 
keep a lookout as they went down Campbell A venue, and 
while the plaintiff would not be bound by any negligence of 
the driver of her car which she could not control or didn't 
]{now or didn't undertake to control, if she were in any re-
spect herself negligent in looking out and keeping a lookout 
she couldn't recover. There is, however, in this case no 
evidence tending to show that the plaintiff herself was neg-
ligent. On the other hand, if this damage of which she com-
plains was caused entirely by the driver of her own car,-
that is, the witness, Thomas 1\files,-if the accident was due 
wholly to a:ny fault of ~files in failing to keep a proper look-
out or failing to stop his car when he could have stopped it, 
or if he could have stopped,-if the injury was due wholly 
to Thomas Miles' fault you can see it wouldn't be just or 
right for you to be finding a verdict against Powell and 
Pratt. On the other hand, if her injuries were due to the 
fault, if you find any fault, of Powell, then she would be 
entitled to have you find a verdict in her favor even though 
Miles might have been at fault, because Miles 
page 132 } wasn't her agent. She was riding more or less 
as a guest in his car and wouldn't be liable for 
the mistake of Miles, the driver of the car. Now, when you 
come to considering negligence again you are confined to the 
neg·ligence that is named in these papers. In other words, 
the defendants are entitled to be put on notice of just what 
carelessness,-a common word for negligence in law,-they 
are to meet. On the testimony here it appears, as a matter 
of law, that the only negligence,-if there was negligence, 
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and as to that the Court makes no intimation at all because 
that is a ~atter for you to decide,-the papers indicate that 
the negligence charged, which is referred to in the evidence, 
is whether it was negligent, and it is for you to determine, 
is the alleged failure to keep a red light on the back of that 
motorcycle and side car. Now, the law in regard to that is 
this: At night a traveler on the highway in such a vehicle 
is required to..have a red light on the rear of the vehicle that 
can be seen for some five hundred feet in order to protect 
himself but he is not required to have that light when stopping · 
at a place on the public street 'vhere there is sufficient light 
from other sources to render it unnecessary to have a light 
to enable people coming up from behind to see the vehicle .. 
So this case boils down to a very simple question for you 
gentlemen to· decide. In the first place, as to this red Iig·ht, 
did the side car and motorcycle have a rear light on it f The 
· evidence here is conflicting. Some say he did and 
page· 133 ~ some say he didn't. It is for you to determine 
which, but if you ~etermine that it didn't have 
a red light that isn't the end of your inquiry. You are fur-
ther to determine whether or not, according to the preponder-
ance· of the evidence, the accident happened at a place where 
the red light wasn't necessary because o~ other lights to en-
able one who was keeping a proper lookout to see this mo-
torcycle and side car. If he had the red light or if it hap-
pened at a place "rhere it wasn't necessary to have a red 
light, then the accident and collision was due apparently not 
to the fault of the man· with the motorcycle and side car, but 
was due 'to the fault of the driver of the automobile in not 
keeping· a proper lookout. As I have already held the street' 
car had a right to stop where it did stop and. there being 
no· evidence of negligence on the part of the driver of the 
street car the street railway company is not liable, as a mat-
ter of law. Now, as to the motor vehicle with the side car. 
It- had a right to stop where it did stop provided it. either 
carried this rear light or was stopping in a place where there 
was sufficient light without the rear light. The mere fact, 
gentlemen, that an accident happened and that this young 
lady was injured through' a collision between the car in which 
she was -riding and thfs motorcycle and side car and street 
. car does not give of itself, if that is all that ap-
page 134 ~ pears, that she was simply hurt. That doesn't 
- . · give her any claim for damages from any of these· 
people, the mere fact that the accident happened. You must' 
g·o ~urther than ~ha! and fi•nd,-in. other words, to warrant 
finding any verdict m her favor you must find that the ac-
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cident happened because of some fault on the part of Melvin 
Powell. 
PLAINTIF:F,'S INSTRUCTION NO. 4. 
The court instructs the jury that if they shall find for the · 
plaintiff against the defendants, they will assess her dam-
ages for the injuries received in the said accident in such a 
sum as will compensate her for, 
(1) the hospital bill, medical attention, drug bill and so 
forth necessarily incurred by her in the treatment of her in-
juries; · 
(2) The loss of time from her employment; 
(3) The physical pain and suffering endured by the plain-
tiff; and . 
( 4) The permane'nt disfigurement of the plaintiff's face 
and head and the n1ental suffering whic:p. the plaintiff has 
already endured and which she will in the future endure as 
a result of such disfigurement, but not to exceed the amount 
sued for. 
By Mr. Frost : If your Honor please, in regard to that 
last instruction there is no evidence of any hospital bill at _all. 
There is no evidence as to the amount or as to 
page 135 ~ what the loss of her services were. 
By the Court: That is true. There was evi-
dence there was a hospital bill and evidence she was attended 
by a physician and there was evidence she was employed 
and did lose some time from her employment, but the evidence 
didn't go further, as the law would require it to do, and show 
how much she had to pay out or lose o·n account of that. In 
other words, gentlemen of the jury, you can't speculate as 
to what the evidence was as to the plaintiff's expenditures. 
To justify recoverrng on those items she must offer testimony 
from which you could figure with reasonable accuracy just 
what those things cost her which she claimed she lost, but 
the other elements here are the basis of proper recovery if 
slie is entitled to recovery a.t all. 
Now, gentlemen, from noting that the cqurt has said dur-
ing· the progress of the trial or in instructing you on the 
law are you to gather that the CC!Urt is malting any comment 
whatever uppn the weight of this testimony or indicating 
to you in· ariy" way whether you shall find for the plaintiff 
or the defendants. That is wholly within your province. You 
arrive a.t your verdict according to what the facts are and 
according to the preponderance of evidence given on the wit-
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ness stand, but after you determine what the facts are in 
this case it is your duty under oath to apply the rules.of law 
given you in the court's instructions. 
By 1vir. Frost: As attorneys for S. Frank Pratt and Mel-
vin 0. Powell we object to the court's failure to 
· pag·e 136 ~ give the instructions in the form and language 
presented by the said defendants. We further 
object to the Court giving the oral instructions and you, of 
course, overrule our objections and we except on the grounds 
stated. 
By the Court : The court has already indicated that he 
thQught the instructions offered in writing were so voluminous 
and in some respects unnecessary that it would be rather 
confusing and would not be helpful in arriving at a verdict 
and that they were fully covered by the instructions the 
court has already given. 
By Mr. Frost: We note our exception. 
By Mr. Jordan : We except to the court "s ruling in declin-
ing to give plaintiff's instruction No. 1. 
page 137 ~PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO.1. 
(Refused.) 
The court instructs the jury that if they believe from a 
preponderance of the evidence that Campbell A venue at the 
point of the accident complained of is a part of the State 
Highway system or a public street of the City of Lynchburg, 
then under the law, the ·automobile in which the plaintiff 
was riding was required to proceed upon the right half of the 
said highway or public street, and that it is a requirement 
of the law that no vehicle (which term includes motorcycle 
side cars) shall be stopped in such a manner as to impede 
or interfere with or render dangerous the use of the said high-
way by others lawfully using the same; and if the jury be-
lieve from a preponderance of the evidence that the motorcycle 
side car in question at the time of the accident had been 
stopped in such a manner as to impede or interfere with or 
render dangerous the use of the said highway by the said 
automobile, then such act on the part of the driver of the 
said motorcycle side car was negligence per se, and if the 
jury further believe that the negligence of the driver of the 
said motorcycle side car in so stopping his vehicle was the 
proximate cause of the collision in which the plaintiff was in-
jured, the jury will ;find for the plaintiff. 
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page 138} PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO.2. 
(Refused.) 
The court instructs the jury that a wrongdoer, if he con-
tributes proximately to an accident in any degree whatever, 
is liable for the entire damage done, although other wrong-
doers may also have contributed to the accident even in a 
greater degree; and if the jury believe from a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the negligence of the driver of the 
said motorcycle side car in stopping the same as aforesaid 
-contributed proximately to the accident in question, then 
the jury will :find for the plaintiff against the defendant Pratt 
and the defendant Powell for the entire damage done. the 
plaintiff. 
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 3. (Refused.) 
The court instructs the jury that the law of Virginia re-
quires tl1at every motor vehicle (which tenn in~ludes motor-
cycle side cars) shall carry at the rear a lamp capable of 
exhibiting· a red light plainly visible under normal atmos-
pheric conditions for a distance of 300 feet to the rear, and 
if the jury believe from a preponderance of the evidence 
that the motorcycle side car in question did not carry such 
a red light and that the failure to carry such a red light 
contributed proximately to cause the said collision, although 
in only a slight degree, then the jury will find for the plain-
tiff against the defendants, S. F. Pratt and Melvin 0. Powell. 
page 139 }"PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO.5. 
(Refused.) 
The court instructs the jury that if they believe from a 
preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff was merely 
a passenger in the automobile in question and had no right 
to give instructions to the driver thereof regarding the con-
trol and direction of the said automobile, then the plaintiff 
was not engaged in a ''joint enterprise'' with the said driver 
and the neglig·ence of the said driver contributing to the said 
nccident, if any, can not be imputed to the plaintiff so as to 
defeat her right to recover in this action; but, in spite of 
nny negligence on the part of the said driver,- the plaintiff 
is entitled to recover against the defendants, if the jury shall 
find from a preponderance of the evidence that the negli-
gence of one or more of the defendants contributed proxi-
mately to the said accident in however slight a degree. 
108 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRU·CTION NO. 6. (Refused.) 
The Court instructs the jury that a person confronted with 
a sudden emergency is not required by law to exercise the 
same presence of mind and degree of care which an.ordinarily 
prudent man would exercise under ordinary· circumstances, 
nor that he act infallibly or wisely, but only such degree of 
care is required of him as would be expected of a reasonable 
and ordinary person in the same circumstances. 
page 140 ~ DE.FENDANTS' INSTRUCTION A. (Refused.) 
The Court instructs the jury that the burden of proof is on 
the plaintiff, Janie F. Miles, to prove her case in every essen-
tial particular by a preponderance of the evidence. The 
mere happening of an accident places no responsibility on 
any ~n~, and Janie F. l\Hles can o·nly recover against the 
defendants, or either of them, by proving by a prepdnderance 
of the evidence that the defendants, or one of them, were 
guilty of negligence, and that such negligence was a proxi-
mate cause of the accident. 
DE·FENDANTS' INSTRUCTION B. (Refused.) 
The Court instructs the jury that it was the duty of Thomas 
Miles to operate the l\Hles automobile in a careful and pru-: 
dent manner; to keep a proper lookout; to operate said auto-
mobile only when it was under complete control; to have 
said automobile equipped with adequate brakes and lights; 
to give adequate and timely warning signals; to drive the 
said automobile at a careful speed, not greater nor less than 
was reasonable or proper, having due regard to the traffic, 
surface,_ and width of the highway and any other conditions 
then existing; to have regard for higway signs; and the Court 
instructs the jury that if they believe from the evidence that 
Thomas Miles failed to operate the said automobile in ac-
cordance with any of the particulars aforesaid, and his fail-
ure ·in any one of these respects was the sole proximate cause 
of the accident, then the plaintiff, Janie F. Miles, cannot re-
cover. 
page 141 ~ DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION C. 
(Refused.) 
· · The Court irtst~ucts the jury that if you believe from 
the evidence that at the time of the accident the street car 
owned by the defendant Lynchburg· Traction & Light Company 
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had come to a full stop, and the motorcycle owned by S. 
Frank Pratt and then driven by l\1:elvin 0. Powell, had like-
wise stopped, and if you further believe from the evidence 
that the street car was lighted, and that there was a street 
arc light nearby, so that both the street car and the motor-
cycle were in fact plainly visible to any one approaching·, and 
if you further believe from the evidence tha.t the said street 
car and motorcycle had stopped and remained standing for 
an appreciable time, ample for the driver of the lV[iles car 
to see them and see the situation, by exercising reasonable 
care, so that he would have had ample time either to have de-
creased his speed or brought his automobile to a stop, and 
thus have avoided the accident, then you are instructed that, 
regardless of whether either the driver of the street car or 
motorcycle had been negligent in stopping at the time and 
where they did, such negligence was not the proximate cause 
of the accident, but the intervening negligence of the driver 
of the 1\riiles car was the proximate cause, and .you must find 
for the defendants. 
page 142 ~ DEFENDANTS' INSTRlTCTION D. 
(Refused.) 
The Court instructs the jury that it is not negligence to 
fail to take precautionary measures to prevent an injury 
which, if taken, would have prevented it, when the injury 
could not have. reasonably been anticipated, and would not 
have happened but for the occurrence of exceptional circum-
stances. 
DEFENPANTS' INSTRUCTION E. (Refused.) 
The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that the operator of the motorcycle and the opera-
tor of the street car were confronted with a sudden emer-
gency, it appearing doubtful to each one whether there was 
sufficient space to safely pass each other while in motion, 
and as the result each one stopped, thereby temporarily 
blocking half of the street, and that this action was such as 
persons under ordinary prudence might have done under a 
like situation, then neither the operator of the motorcycle 
nor the operator of the street car would be guilty of negli-
gence, because another course might have been more judi-
cious, and even though such other course might have pre-
vented blocking the said street. 
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page 143 ~ DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION F. 
(Refused.) 
The Court instructs the jury that under the laws of the 
State of Virginia, and the ordinances of the City of Lynch-
burg, it is not negligent for a person to· park a motorcycle 
in the City of Lynchburg in the night-time without lights, 
when there is sufficient light to reveal any person within a 
distance of 200 feet at the place where the motorcycle is 
parked. Therefore. the Court instructs the jury that if they 
believe from the evidence that there was sufficient light to 
enable any one to see the parked motorcycle for a distance 
of 200 feet or more, then S. Frank Pratt and Melvin 0. Pow-
ell were not negligent in failing to have the rear light on the 
motorcycle burning. 
DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION G. (Refused.) 
The Court instructs the jury that in considering this case, 
you must consider it from the point of view of evidence and 
instructions, and that you must no·u, allow any question of 
sympathy for the plaintiff to enter into your deliberations, 
as the case is to be decided on the la'v and facts, regardless 
of sympathy. 
page 144 ~ DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION H. 
(Refused.) 
The Court instructs the jury that it is the duty of the 
driver of an automobile, when driving in the night time, to 
drive a.t such a speed that he can stop the said atuomobile 
within the range of his vision, and if you believe from the 
evidence that Thomas 1\Hles was driving the· Miles automo-
bile at such a speed that he could not stop within the range 
of his vision, and if you further believe that such negligence 
was the sole proximate cause of the accident, you shall find 
for the defendants. 
Note: The case having been fully argued by counsel; the 
jury having viewed the scene of the accident, retired to their 
room and after some deliberation brought in the following 
verdicts: 
"We, the jury, find for the defendant, Lynchburg Trac-
tion & Light Company, and, we, the jury, find for "the plain-
tiff ag·ainst S. F. Pratt and Melvin 0. Powell the amount of 
Fifteen hundred dollars. Edgar M. Shaner, Foreman." 
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By Mr. Frost: I want to make a motion on behalf of the 
defendants, S. Frank Pratt and Melvin 0. P.owell to set aside 
the verdict on the grounds that it is contrary to the law and 
the evidence; because there is no negligence sho~ to be the 
proximate cause of the accident; because the yerdict is ex-
cessive, and for the following reasons; the failure 
page 145 } of the court to strike out the bill of particulars; 
· for the reasons hereinbefore assigned; for the 
refusal to admit evidence; for the refusal to strike out the 
evidence at the end of the testimony in the case and for the 
refusal of the Court to give instructions offered by the de-
fendants and the giving of oral instructions in lieu thereof. 
Now, your Honor, I would like to have an opportunity to 
be heard after I have had the record written out. 
By the Court: I 'vill hear you on the morning of March 
28th, at nine o'clock. 
page 146} CERTIFICATE. 
I, Aubrey E. Strode, Judge of the Corporation Court for 
the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, who presided over the trial 
of the case of Janie F. Miles v. Lynchburg Traction & Light 
Company, S. Frank Pratt and ~Ielvin 0. Powell, to the rec-
ord, testimony and other incidents of which said trial this 
. certificate is attached, do hereby certify that the foregoing 
is a true and correct copy of all testimony, agreements and 
other incidents which were introduced or that occurred during 
said trial, including all instructions requested, amended, 
given and refused and questions raised, and all rulings there-
on, including exceptions, grounds of objections to the admis- . 
sion and exclusion of evidence. 
I do further certify that the said case was tried in the Cor-
poration Court for the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, on the 
19th and 20th days of March, 1935, and it appears in writ-
ing that the plarnti:ff by her attorney has had reasonable no-
tice of the time and place when this testimony and other in-
cidents of trial 'vould be tendered and presented to the un-
dersigned for certification, which is certified within sixty days 
after final judgment. 
Given under my hand and seal this 15th day of April, 1935. 
AUBREY E. STRODE, (Seal) 
Judge of the Corporation Court for the City 
of Lynchburg, Virginia. 
Filed in Clerk's Office of Corporation Court of Lynchburg, 
V a., April 15th, 1935. 
HUBERT H. MARTIN, C'lerk. 
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page 147 ~ I, Hubert H. Martin, Clerk of the Corporation 
. Court of the city of Lynchburg, hereby certify 
that the foregoing is a true transcript of the record of the 
case of Janie F. Miles, an infant, by, &c., against S. Frank 
Pratt and Melvin 0. Powell, and I further certify that no-
tices as required by Section 6253-f and Section 6339 of the 
Code were duly given as appears by paper writings filed with 
the record of said case. 
The fee for making this transcript is $17.50. 
Given under my hand this 26th day of April, 1935. 
HUBERT H. MARTIN, Clerk. 
A Copy-Teste : 
~LB. WATTS, C. C. 
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